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Introduction
The Mexican War has remained notable in American history for the amazing
successes of U.S. soldiers against a supposedly superior enemy, but few of the
campaigns are as remarkable as Colonel Alexander Doniphan's expedition into
Chihuahua during the winter of 1846-18^7. With approximately 1000 men, he
invaded the major province of Northern Mexico, fought and won two battles
against larger Mexican forces, and held the provincial capital until ordered
to return. After the two battles he never faced any serious danger from enemy
forces and had little difficulty holding the city of Chihuahua, thanks to the
great desolate distances which separated him from organized Mexican opposition.
None of the other campaigns — Zachary Taylor's, Winfield Scott's, or John C.
Fremont's — accomplished as much with such a small force or with as little
difficulty. Taylor's much stronger army fought and won several closely-con-
tested battles, such as Monterey and Buena Vista, but wasted much time and
effort dealing with local guerrillas. Scott also had a more numerous force
and great difficulty with guerrillas. Finally, Fremont's activities in Cal-
ifornia may have resembled Doniphan's initially, in terms of both numbers and
success, but Mexican counterattacks nearly threw the Americans out of the area,
due to the latter 's numerical inferiority and poor tactics. Only hard fighting
regained it, something Doniphan did not suffer, because of the lack of any
enemy forces after his victories.
Doniphan's campaign receives little coverage in most modern histories of
the Mexican War. Although this independent expedition may not have had any
significant effect on the war's outcome, it remains worthy of study for sev-
eral reasons. Doniphan showed what a force of semi-trained volunteers could
accomplish without the support of regular troops, if it had proper leadership
and high morale. He helped to pacify a hostile area by means of his just treat-
ment of Mexican citizens and his willingness to protect them from Indians.
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This served as an example of the proper method for occupying enemy territory,
as evidenced by American actions during the Spanish-American War in 1898. In
addition, Doniphan's campaign is also one of the earliest examples in American
military history of an army operating in hostile territory without a supply
line and living off the country, for which General William T. Sherman later
became famous in the Civil War. Finally, the campaign contributed to the myth
of American invincibility among the Mexicans, thus weakening their will to re-
sist. It reinforced the American legend of ability to overcome hardship, since
the troops suffered from thirst, cold, and lack of supplies.
In addition to the above accomplishments, Doniphan's expedition also pro-
vided more practical results. It reopened trade between Missouri and Northern
Mexico, which had suffered after war broke out and had partially caused the
campaign. More importantly, it removed a threat to U.S. occupation and even-
tual annexation of New Mexico when Doniphan drove the only organized Mexican
force near the area out of Chihuahua. This allowed the Americans to consolidate
their hold on the territory and prevented the Mexicans from giving support to
the January 184? revolt in New Mexico.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the campaign, however, was what Don-
iphan accomplished, with a force of ill-clad, poorly-fed, unpaid volunteers.
The troops were never paid after leaving Fort Leavenworth to march west. Fur-
thermore, they subsisted on reduced rations for most of their period of service,
and could not replace worn-out uniforms. One would expect a force in this
condition, lacking the training and the tradition of regulars, to refuse to
obey orders, or to pillage the territory to alleviate its problems. The Mis-
souri volunteers did neither. They continued to obey Doniphan throughout the
campaign, and because of his orders generally refrained from molesting the
inhabitants. Their continued loyalty and obedience made Doniphan's success
possible.
The material poverty of the troops resulted from a conflict between Doni-
phan and the Army's finance policy. The U.S. government paid its troops in
paper scrip normally redeemable anywhere. Mexican merchants had accepted it
as payment prior to the war, especially around Santa Fe. However, they refused
to honor scrip after the war began since it came from a hostile government and
thus lacked guaranteed redemption. Acceptance of American scrip might also
brand a Mexican as a traitor and make him liable to reprisals by his more pa-
triotic neighbors. Since scrip was useless in Mexican territory, Doniphan in-
sisted that his men be paid in specie, which the Mexicans would accept. No
specie arrived for this purpose, so the troops remained unpaid, and therefore
unable to buy food and clothing. Indirectly, the lack of pay also caused the
shortage of rations, since Doniphan insisted the men pay for anything they took
from the Mexicans. The government sent few supplies from the States and hunt-
ing generally was poor, leaving the local people as the major suppliers of food.
The same reasons likewise resulted in the troops' lack of uniforms, thus re-
quiring them to wear whatever they could get to replace those worn-out. The
Missourians did not get any pay until they returned home, except for one com-
pany which drew its clothing allowance in scrip while in New Mexico.
The success of Doniphan's campaign resulted in great part from his personal
character and ability. His background had equipped him with the knowledge to
understand and handle the independent Missourians. Born in Mason County,
Kentucky on 9 July, 1808, he entered school at nearby Augusta when he was eight
years old. Ten years later he graduated from Augusta College, which he had
entered at 14, and immediately began studying law under a prominent local at-
torney, Martin Marshall. In 1829, after three years of study, he received
permission to practice law in Ohio and Kentucky. They in 1830 he moved to
Lexington, Missouri, gained admission to the Missouri bar, and began his career
as a prominent defense attorney.
Doniphan supported the U.S. government throughout his life and believed
in obeying its dictates, even when these feelings ran counter to local sen-
timent during the Civil War. These beliefs came from the influence of two of
his teachers, Marshall and Richard Keene, his childhood instructor. They gave
him a strong literary background through study of the classics and great poets,
which made him proficient in eloquence and oratory, and a sense of respect for
the American system of government. Marshall's lessons in law and the U.S.
Constitution especially shaped the latter aspect of Doniphan's character.
These sides of his character helped Doniphan to establish a reputation
as a successful lawyer in a frontier area where a man's character determined
his position among his neighbors. His eloquent speech and debating ability
had a greater effect on his achievements, however. Partly natural, partly
learned during his schooling, these traits gave him a power to sway juries which
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seemed nearly infallible. Doniphan soon found himself involved in nearly every
important case in the area, but always on the side of the defense. His sense
of justice would not allow him to serve on the prosecution at any time in his
life.
One early example of Doniphan's legal ability was his defense of Orrin
Rockwell, a Mormon charged with conspiring to murder the Governor. Although
the plot failed, public outrage coupled with strong anti-Mormon sentiments (due
to Mormon religious beliefs) created a desire for revenge among the people
against the defendent.
In this case, Doniphan proved that he could sway public opinion, if not
completely, at least to a great extent, a talent which would prove valuable
when he attempted to command a group of independent citizen soldiers who ob-
jected to formal control. In the trial, even his eloquent arguments failed
to overcome the anti-Mormon sentiment and the jury found Rockwell guilty. How-
ever, his abilities as a defense lawyer may never have shone brighter, for he
was able to win a sentence of only five minutes in jail for his client. 3 Since
the 1830 's was a period when people considered Mormons a threat to religion
and American society, subject to attack at the slightest opportunity, this
result emphasizes Doniphan's talent for influencing people's views.
In 1833, Doniphan moved from Lexington to Liberty in Clay County, Missouri,
which he regarded as home for the rest of his life. Here he continued his legal
practice, and became a prominent, highly respected member of the community.
His election to the Missouri General Assembly as Whig representative from Clay
County in I836 suggests the esteem in which his neighbors held him. This also
helped his Mexican War career, since volunteers usually prefer to follow a
person with a reputation for leadership. Doniphan held the same office twice
more during his life, in 1840 and 1854. Although clearly a local leader, Don-
ipnan evidently lacked a deep passion for politics, since he did not campaign
for or occupy any other civil elective position. In fact, his friends may have
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forced him to run for office when he was elected.
In 1837, Doniphan took a vacation from his legal practice long enough to
marry Elizabeth Thornton, a local girl. They became devoted to each other and
remained together at home except when business necessitated Doniphan's absence.
Their union produced two sons, Jordan born in I838 and Alexander, Junior, born
in 1840.
In military affairs Doniphan also gained useful experience prior to the
Mexican War. In I838, as a brigadier-general in the Missouri Militia, he par-
ticipated in the campaign against the Mormons in his state. Although biograph-
ical sketches of Doniphan give no details, this undertaking probably gave him
some experience in leading citizen-soldiers and taught him how to handle them
to get maximum results. He also may have learned something about the consider-
ations which go into conducting a military expedition, such as the problems
of logistics and maneuvering troops in the field. These experiences would prove
useful later in Mexico. Further military teachings possibly came from Albert
Sydney Johnston, later a noted Confederate general, when he was stationed at
nearby Fort Leavenworth, since records indicate that he socialized with Doniphan.
While Doniphan evidently palyed no major role in the Mormon campaign, he
did dominate the court trial which was its aftermath. Having already refused
to obey an order to shoot Mormon leaders after they surrendered, he defended
them at the trial and prevented their execution. Again, these events show his
strong moral beliefs and sense of justice.
If Doniphan had the social prominence, influence and previous military
experience necessary to lead volunteers, he also seemingly had satisfactory
material to work with during his Mexican campaign. The men who followed him
came primarily from Central and Western Missouri, the same areas which would
later provide the Border Ruffians for the troubles in Kansas a decade liter.
For the most part they were young men, either single or recently married, and
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generally members of the most prominent families in the region. The regiment
also contained a few old frontiersmen who had lived in the wilderness all of
their lives and had made marksmanship into a fine art. Of course, since the
area was still a frontier region all of the volunteers had experience with rifles
and rough living, if only from regular hunting trips. This helped them adjust
to the practical hardships of campaigning. Many of them surely had some ex-
perience in the militia and may have participated in the Mormon campaign of
I838, thus giving them some idea of what to expect. Young, fearless, self-
reliant, expert in marksmanship and inured to hardship, they were the epitome
of the American volunteer soldier.
In addition to the above virtues, however, the Missourians had some vices.
They had all of the independence ascribed to frontiersmen down to the last "E"
,
as they proved during the Chihuahua campaign. While they might obey a local
leader of standing and experience, any attempt by regular officers to command
them usually resulted in grudging acquiescence or outright mutiny, depending
on the order and the officer. They had no patience with army courtesy and drill.
Attempts to subject them to military discipline failed completely because of
this. They had enlisted to fight, not to salute officers or hold parades.
Boisterous by nature, they did not react will to camp or garrison life. Long
periods of idleness usually resulted in heavy gambling and drinking, which cul-
minated in brawls among themselves or with the local people. These in turn
led to unnecessary casualties and poor public relations neither of which held
much attraction for the officers. Finally, they had much of the arrogance of
Americans in the age of Manifest Destiny. Believing themselves members of a
superior society, they looked down upon non-Americans with contempt. This
created some mutual hostility when international contacts occurred, although
such feelings usually softened on both sides after a period of time, or so was
the case with Doniphan's expedition.
Several factors motivated these men to enlist and leave their homes. The
major one probably was a desire for adventure and a wish to prove themselves
as soldiers. Being young, many of the volunteers possibly wished to abandon
the ordinary life of a Missouri farm for a period of dangerous and exciting
military life in the West. Intense patriotism caused others (probably including
Doniphan) to join the colors. The "perfidious Mexicans" had slain American
troops on American soil, an insult which the volunteers wished to avenge. These
men believed they had a duty to "defend" their country, even on enemy soil.
The acquisition of new territory provided further motivation. In particular,
the Missourians saw advantages to conquering the New Mexico territory, the ter-
minus of the Santa Fe trade. This commerce had a major impact on the state's
economy and such conquest would eliminate the Mexican tariffs on it, thus in-
creasing the profits for those people engaged in the business. Coupled with
this was the concept of Manifest Destiny, although it probably had much less
influence. Yet little doubt can exist that some of the volunteers received
exposure to the idea that America eventually would expand to its natural bound-
aries (at the least to the Pacific Ocean) and that the time to further this
dream had arrived. Social pressures and the esteem which went with enlisting
may also have been an enticement. To join their friends or to prove their man-
hood would have seemed sufficient reason for volunteering to many young men.
8In addition, anti-Mexican sentiment reigned strong in Missouri, left over from
8
the Texas revolt in which many Missourians had participated. Finally, a few
men joined simply because they had nothing better to do and suffered from bore-
dom. In short, the common reasons for voluntary wartime service seem to have
motivated the Missourians, except for the direct interest in New Mexico.
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Doniphan's Route from Missouri to Chihuahua to New Orleans
(from: The American Heritage Pictorial Atlas of United States History
,
New York; American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1966) 163.
Scale: 1 inch equals 200 miles
Chapter 1:
Unit Organization and the Trek to Santa Fe
The New Mexico province played an important role in causing the war which
gave Doniphan and his men their niche in history. In this area the first major
contacts between the United States and an independent Mexico occurred, contacts
which increased as the young United States pushed westward searching for more
land and profit for its citizens. This expansion helped bring on the war, for
Americans increasingly settled in the Texas-New Mexico region and came to dom-
inate it, which the Mexicans resented. U.S. attempts to purchase much of the
area west of Texas following Texas independence, finally pressured Mexican lead-
ership to use force to stop this imperialism, thus the declaration of war.
U.S. interest in New Mexico had begun even before Mexico's independence,
however. Zebulon Pike entered the region in 180?, marking the first direct
contact with the culture which would become the United States* southern neighbor.
Pike, an American army officer, had been exploring sections of land in the re-
cent Louisiana Purchase area for the Federal government and had encamped on
the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico. There the Spanish arrested him on charges
of espionage, but allowed him to move about freely while in the provincial cap-
ital of Chihuahua. Eventually they released the exploring party in order to
avert possible American retaliation. The whole affair thus became little more
than a minor misunderstanding.
Pike's expedition, however, did play an important part in future United
States-Mexican relations. Pike brought back much information on economic con-
ditions in New Mexico, gathered from his observations while in Santa Fe and
Chihuahua. He also provided geographical reports on much of the region north
and east of these cities. Americans later used these reports to lay the ground-
work for their most significant contact with Mexico — the Santa Fe trade.
Pike's accounts of the high prices paid for luxury items, particularly textiles,
' c
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in New Mexico aroused the Americans' ommercial spirit. In 181'0, a small party
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of traders took a load of goods from Northern Louisiana into Mexico in an at-
tempt to enter this potentially profitable business. They discovered, however,
that the Spanish authorities objected to American business ventures. They con-
fiscated the traders' merchandise and imprisoned the Americans for two years.
Later parties unfailingly suffered similar treatment. For the time being trade
between the United States and Santa Fe was impossible, until the Mexican pol-
itical changes of 1821 occurred.
The Spanish opposed the Santa Fe trade primarily because of their standard
colonial policy. Spain had always controlled trade in the Mexican provinces
and had forbidden the importation of foreign goods, just as it did in all of
its overseas possessions. The royal government prohibited commercial dealings
outside the empire. Several provincial governors used this monopoly to augment
their income by engaging in trade themselves or placing tax restrictions on
it. American traffic would not only violate the official edicts, but also
undercut these officials' profits. Coupled with the prohibition was the Spanish
fear that contact with other countries would weaken their own control over the
colonies. While this was true of all foreign nations, past history may have
aggravated it in the United States' case. The American Revolution had created
a spirit of defiance of foreign authority and personal independence among Amer-
ican citizens. No doubt the Spanish feared that Americans would spread their
revolutionary ideals among the populace and encourage them to revolt. Contact
with a nation which had established itself by driving out its mother country
could cause a similar occurrence in Mexico, something which Spain naturally
wished to avoid.
Finally, a traditional hatred of Fngland and its colonies also may have
influenced Spanish opposition to the trade. The two nations had opposed each
other in the search for trade and colonies for three centuries, particularly
in North America, with Spain generally coming off second best. The old rivalry,
coupled with England's increase in power and Spain's decline, could have made
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the Spanish hostile to trade with former English colonies. This would be true
especially of one which already had taken a large portion of the North American
continent which Spain had claimed. The Louisiana Territory, which the Spanish
had controlled and had expected to receive back from France, provided fuel for
these feelings. When France sold it to the United States instead, Spain con-
sidered the transaction illegal.
After Mexico gained its independence in 1821, however, the trade pattern
reversed itself. When William Becknell led a small trading party into Santa
Fe that year, he found the Mexicans eager to purchase his goods and to open
regular trade with Missouri. News of this trading success stimulated the form-
ation of larger expeditions and for the next several years increasing amounts
of American goods rolled into Northern Mexico, while Mexican raw materials flowed
back along the Santa Fe Trail to the States.
As this commerce continued, however, difficulties arose between the two
nationalities. High tariffs and strict controls which Mexico imposed on trade,
along with the corrupt officials who enforced them were the major causes. The
tariffs, amounting to 25 percent of the value on some goods, were an important
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source of government income. To these regular taxes local officials fre-
quently added arbitrary charges for their own profit. When the Americans began
using various questionable practices to reduce or evade these charges, the
Mexicans countered with requirements for duplicate cargo manifests in Spanish
and detailed identity cards, as well as with other restrictions. Harassment
and occasional imprisonment of U.S. traders also increased American resentment,
as did a brief Mexican embargo in 18^3. By 1846, the Americans involved had
become vocal in their desire either to annex New Mexico or to force the Mexican
government to change its policies, and thus remove these barriers to their pros-
perity. Therefore they supported a war with Mexico.
Aside from the commercial difficulties in New Mexico, another important
irritant between the two countries lay in the Texas question. Mexico's offer
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of land to American settlers had led to an influx into this province, which
continued after Mexico forgade further immigration. The resulting cultural
clash, as well as opposition to certain policies of the Mexican government,
caused the Texans to revolt in I836. Although they successfully drove out the
Mexican army and set up an independent republic, Mexico refused to recognize
it and fought a "cold war" with Texas for the next ten years to reassert its
authority. Since American sympathy and support had lain with the Texans, Mexico
was bitter toward the United States for its interference in internal affairs.
When Texas requested annexation to the U.S. and the government expressed favor-
able interest in it, the Mexicans saw this as a blatant attempt to steal ter-
ritory which was rightfully theirs. When Texas entered the Union, the question
of whether the Rio Grande or the Nueces River farther north was its correct
boundary exacerbated this feeling and supplied the direct cause for the war,
since the first bloodshed took place between these rivers. In one sense this
problem spilled over into New Mexico, for Americans also settled there, although
not in the large numbers that moved to Texas. Yet they still represented a
threat to Mexican control, especially after U.S. interest in that region became
manifest. Fearing another possible revolution, Mexico tightened its anti-
American restrictions in this area, which caused further difficulties for Amer-
ican traders and a greater desire on their part for New Mexico's annexation.
The American appetite for territory showed itself in other areas as well.
Aside from the desire for the New Mexico region, the United States had also
shown interest in acquiring the Mexican province of California. This area
represented the natural western boundary of the country to many Americans who
accepted the precepts of Manifest Destiny. Also, merchant ships which had traded
there brought back glowing reports of its wealth and beauty, which incited
American greed and pioneering instincts. The fact that Mexico had little con-
trol over California further encouraged acquisition, for some residents indicated
a desire for rule by another power and several European nations showed interest
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in annexing it. If the United States did not get control of California soon,
another country probably would and thus seal off the U.S. from the Pacific.
This would also deprive it of useful port sites for the lucrative Oriental trade
which the U.S. had established. Such ports, coupled with adequate transcon-
tinental communications, eventually would eliminate the expensive sailings from
Eastern seaports, since goods could enter and leave the country directly on
the West Coast. Not only would this be more profitable, but it would give the
United States an advantage over European nations engaged in the same business.
This desire for California further encouraged the takeover of New Mexico.
The southwestern territory would provide an important connecting link between
the rest of the United States and the Pacific Coast. It would establish a
stronger bond between them than the narrower tie between Utah and the Canadian
border would allow, and thus make communication easier. In Mexican hands, the
province would remain a salient thrust into American territory, a constant
threat to security, since the Mexicans could use it as a base from which to
retake either California or Texas. Furthermore, New Mexico could provide an
important route for transcontinental communication, especially from the Southern
states. Therefore, its acquisition seemed necessary as a steppingstone to
California.
All of these territorial desires reflected the American concepts of Manifest
Destiny, which proposed that God intended the United States to stretch from
the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. Although the people disagreed on exactly
how much territory this would cover, they frequently interpreted it to mean
that the U.S. would eventually govern all of North America, from the North Pole
to the Panamanian isthmus. However, acquisition of lands of New Mexico and
California was of first importance, since they seemed most readily available
and since they would enable the Americans to reach the Pacific Ocean, thus ac-
cruing all of the previously-mentioned benefits. Manifest Destiny also included
the belief that American culture and industry were superior to anyone else's
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and thus that the U.S. had an obligation to convert the rest of the world to
its lifestyle. Immediate neighbors became the first targets for this crusade,
since the Americans could reach them most easily, and their weaknesses were
most evident.
The annexation of Texas and attempts to acquire New Mexico and California
were major causes of the Mexican War. President James K. Polk had campaigned
on a platform to achieve these goals in 1844, and proved to be one of the few
presidents able to carry out his campaign promises. He pushed an annexation
bill through Congress and successfully brought Texas into the Union in 1845.
The Mexicans denounced this as an unwarranted act of aggression and declared
13
that they would continue to try to recover their wayward province by force.
They also continued to deny Texan claims to the area between the Nueces River
and the Rio Grande. Polk responded by sending 3000 soldiers under General
Zachary Taylor into the disputed region to protect Texas from Mexican incursions
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and to show the government's support for its claims.
At the same time Polk tried to resolve the problem peacefully. Learning
that the Mexican government would negotiate if it did not exhibit weakness in
doing so, he sent John Slidell to Mexico for the purpose. Slidell received
authorization to purchase the disputed Texas area, New Mexico and California
for a miximum of $30 million and the assumption of U.S. citizens' claims against
Mexico. This would not only acquire all desired territory, but also would solve
the problem of trade difficulties with New Mexico by eliminating the Santa Fe
tariffs placed on U.S. goods.
Unfortunately, Slidell' s mission failed. Popular sentiment in Mexico op-
posed negotiation and favored war with the gringos, and the central government
felt too weak to oppose it. The officials first asked Slidell to return at a
later date. Then they claimed they had no authority to discuss any issue except
the Texas question. While Slidell waited to open negotiations, a revolution
set up a new government, which seemed willing to yield claims to Texas beyond
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the Nueces River, but would discuss no other topics. Slidell returned to the
U.S. at the same time an army moved north to deal with Taylor's "invasion" of
the disputed region.
Although New Mexico was only one item on Slidell' s agenda, its' acquisition
represented a major goal. Annexation of the region would help satisfy expan-
sionist desires. More importantly, it would bring that econimically profitable
territory under U.S. control, thus eliminating the international trade barriers
which currently obstructed the Santa Fe caravans. Mexican refusal to discuss
the issue showed that they recognized New Mexico's value and desired to retain
possession of it. Even if Mexico recognized Texas independence and sold Cali-
fornia, however, U.S. control of New Mexico remained necessary, for the strategic
and economic reasons of contiguity to other possessions. Therefore the nego-
tiations took an "all or nothing" slant, which probably further hindered Slidell'
s
success, since in life price as the only open issue.
Hostilities began in April, 1846, shortly after the Mexican army arrived
at the Rio Grande. On the 24th, a body of troops crossed the river and ambushed
an American patrol, killing or capturing nearly everyone. Several days later
the Mexicans besieged a small fort on the riverbank and blocked Taylor's path
when he marched to relieve it. Taylor attacked and drove them off the field
in a tactical victory, but the next day the Mexicans again blocked his advance.
In the ensuing battle, the Americans' spirit proved superior, and their furious
charges drove the enemy across the Rio Grande in panic. When word of these
battles reached Washington, the government declared war and began preparation
to take by force what it could not gain by purchase.
The decision to invade Chihuahua, an area which seemingly held little im-
portance for U.S. interests, originated in Washington as part of the overall
American war strategy. President Polk, while meeting with Winfield Scott,
General in Chief of the American army, and Secretary of War William Marcy on
April 14th, decided to send four separate columns of troops into Mexican ter-
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ritory. Taylor's army would invade the Northern provinces immediately. The
main army under Scott himself would cross the Rio Grande and occupy the Mexican
interior, while another force of 2000 men would capture Santa Fe and a fourth
army of 4000 troops would advance on Chihuahua.
Why did the American strategists include Chihuahua as a target? It appeared
to be far removed from the main areas of U.S. interest, Texas and New Mexico.
Also, it rested in a seemingly desolate area of no apparent military value.
No munitions industries operated in the city, and it did not occupy an important
spot on a major road. Yet the number of troops assigned to itfc capture indicated
that Polk and his advisors considered it important.
The answers lay in Chihuahua's location and its relationship to American
trade. As the only large city in Northern Mexico, its capture would be a moral
victory which would awe the surrounding natives as well as provide a center
from which to conduct local operations. More importantly, it could act as a
base for an American force which would march due west and seize Guaymas on the
Gulf of California coast, thus severing all of Northern Mexico from the rest
of the country. This not only would prevent the Northern and Southern regions
from providing support for each other, but also would permit the United States
to annex all of Northern Mexico if it chose to do so. While Polk may not have
considered this latter point when he formulated the war strategy, American mil-
itary successes encouraged widespread annexation as a possible goal. Doniphan's
men certainly expected it. Several of the diaries written by men in his regi-
ment contain remarks on how the Americans would improve the territory after
the war. However, control of New Mexico necessitated the conquest of Chihuahua,
an arid stock-raising province, but with enough fertile soil to produce a sur-
plus of crops
o
Other reasons for a Chihuahua expedition, related to its location and im-
portance, also became evident. Army occupation of Chihuahua would eliminate
Mexican forces in that region. Such troops represented a potential danger to
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either Taylor's army or the California invasion force, since they were in an
ideal position to strike the flank of either one. Also, if not defeated they
might reinforce the main Mexican army or the Santa Fe garrison and thus make
overcoming them more difficult. The Americans doubtless overestimated the num-
ber and value of the Chihuahua forces in making these conclusions, since they
had only limited intelligence of questionable accuracy from U.S. citizens in
the region, but this consideration did help encourage the expedition.
The United States also received encouragement for an invasion from the
reports of local attitudes provided by the above-mentioned sources. Traders
living in Chihuahua or returning from there stated that the region's inhabitants
showed much sympathy for the American cause and a dislike for their own govern-
ment. They indicated that if U.S. troops entered the province, the natives
would flock to their support and the local government would fall without dif-
ficulty. They also reported a desire among the people for annexation to the
United States. Although a strong liklihood existed that the merchants exagger-
ated the favorable opinions for their own interests, since American occupation
would both protect them and reopen their markets, the possibility of strong
local support justified an invasion attempt.
Diplomatic reasons for Chihuahua's capture also may have existed. Although
no concrete evidence concerning it has appeared, the possibility exists that
the American government wanted the province to use as a bargaining position
for peace negotiations. It could return Chihuahua in exchange for other ter-
ritory (perhaps part of California or New Mexico) which it might have failed
to conquer, or for some other considerations. This practice had been common
in the 18th century, and while the United States had not used such ploys, no
reason exists to assume that the government did not consider it.
Perhaps the most important reason for Chihuahua's capture, however, was
its apparent role in the economy of both countries. For Mexico it once had
been a major mining center, and according to reports, still produced a signi-
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fleant amount of valuable minerals. Due to this and its importance as the only
major city, it served as the economic center for the entire region, and thus
its conquest would disrupt the local Mexican economy. Also, the Americans saw
Chihuahua as the terminus of the Santa Fe trade. Because of its reported wealth
and economic importance, many merchants traded there instead of at Santa Fe.
Until the U.S. captured it, they could not conduct their business and therefore
they undoubtedly put pressure on the government to take it as soon as possible.
Considering the Santa Fe trade's importance and Chihuahua's role in it, the
city's capture obviously appeared desirable, although Doniphan's invasion proved
that the reports had exaggerated its wealth.
To undertake the Santa Fe/Chihuahua campaign, the U.S. government called
for volunteers from the various states and instructed General Stephen W. Kearny,
whom it had appointed to command the column aimed at Santa Fe, to integrate
those from Missouri into his force. Since the war was popular in Missouri,
Kearny easily gained his quota of men. William Kennerly, who joined the force
with a volunteer artillery battery from St. Louis, noted that:
Feelings against the Mexicans for the terrible massacre
of the Alamo were still high in Missouri, for many of these
settlers of Texas had gone there from our state. Therefore,
when war was declared there was no difficulty in raising . -
several companies of militia to take arms against Mexico.
A fellow artilleryman, Frank Edwards, also remarked on the enthusiasm for the
war: "the young men of all classes were eager to go — indeed, it became a
question of who must be left" . Eventually Kearny gathered about 1^-00 volun-
teers, who made up a mounted regiment of eight companies, two artillery batter-
ies, and two small infantry companies. Organized by counties of origin, these
units began arriving at Fort Leavenworth in early June, where officials mustered
them into federal service.
One puzzling question connected with the volunteers concerns how much equip-
ment they received from the government and how much (weapons, for instance)
they supplied^ themselves. Most accounts mention the Missourians as carrying
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rifles during the campaign and provide other evidence, such as accuracy, to
support the idea that they actually used rifled muskets. Since the U.S. Army
still used smoothbore muskets for the most part and had few rifles available,
the volunteers probably supplied their own. Jefferson Davis, a U.S. Representa-
tive from Mississippi, a strong Polk supporter and Taylor's son-in-law, did
get government rifles for the regiment he raised and commanded, but neither
Kearny nor Doniphan had his political power. Davis himself only got the rifles
with great difficulty, so the possibility of someone with weaker political con-
nections getting them seems remote.
The Missourians did bring most of their own equipment. The artillerymen
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from St. Louis certainly supplied most of their own needs except for arms.
Members of the expedition also used their own horses and clothing as Polk had
instructed when he called for volunteers, and received a pay allowance at least
for the latter. Beyond this, however, no contemporary author commented.
A few later historians made the unsupported assertion the the Missourians re-
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ceived most of their equipment, including all armament, at Fort Leavenworth.
Yet the diarists among the volunteers fail to mention drawing any firearms.
On the other hand according to them, sabers, mess kits and similar uncommon
military items came from government stocks. Therefore the primary evidence
would indicate that the Missourians supplied their own horses, clothing and
firearms, while the government equipped them with the other necessities.
As the companies arrived at Fort Leavenworth, they received letter desig-
nations and became part of the regimental structure. When complete, the units
that would follow Doniphan into Mexico included nine companies of mounted rifle-
men and an artillery battery. In addition, the Missourians also produced two
infantry companies and another battery. Eight of the horse companies made up
a regiment, called the First Regiment, Missouri Mounted Volunteers: Company
A from Jackson County under Captain David Waldo (ll6 men); Company B from La-
fayette County under Captain William Walton (112 men); Company C from Clay County
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under Captain O.P. Moss (119 men); Company D from Saline County under Captain
John Reid (95 men); Company E from Franklin County under Captain John Stephenson
(113 men); Company F from Cole County under Captain M.M. Parsons (90 men);
Company G from Howard County under Captain Horatio Hughes (108 men); and Com-
pany H from Callaway County under Captain Charles Rodgers (110 men). The citi-
zens of St. Louis provided the ninth company, known as the Laclede Rangers led
by Captain Thomas Hudson (1C4 men). They also contributed Battery A and Battery
B of the Missouri Light Artillery Battalion under Captain R.H. Weightman (ll6 men)
and Captain Holdeman Fisher (125 men) respectively. The two companies of infan-
try, grouped under the heading of Battalion Infantry, were: Captain William
Anzney's Company A from Cole County (71 men) and Captain W.S. Murphy's Company
B from Platte County (78 men).
2 The last three units did not participate in
the Chihuahua invasion. The total shows that Missouri contributed 1388 men
plus staff officers and company commanders to the initial invasion force.
While the volunteers elected company officers before leaving their homes,
(American militia units commonly elected their officers rather than accept ones
trained and appointed by the government), regimental elections waited until
most of them had arrived at Fort Leavenworth. Two men campaigned for regimental
colonel, Doniphan and John W. Price of Howard County. Price, who had served
unspectacularly in the Seminole War, lost overwhelmingly to Doniphan. Some
evidence exists that Doniphan had begun campaigning before reaching Leavenworth
as other volunteers passed through Clay Comity, but his fame as a lawyer and
oratorical skill probably had greater influence on the outcome. The result
also indicates that the Missourians may have preferred their leaders not to
have had any regular army experience. William Gilpin and C.F. Ruff competed
for the lieutenant-colonelcy, which Ruff won by a mere two votes. Gilpin then
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defeated several other candidates for the office of major. Both men had ax-
tended West Point and Ruff had served in the dragoons, but neither currently
had any ties with the regular army. In fact, Gilpin turned down a lieutenantcy
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The Counties Doniphan's Ken Came From
(specific counties are blacked in)
(from: Duane Meyer,, The Heritage of Missouri — A History . St. Louis;
State Publishing Co., Inc., 1963) 693.
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in the regulars in order to run for major.
The volunteers spent most of June learning the basics of military life.
Twice daily, in the morning and afternoon, they underwent rigorous drilling
in cavalry and infantry maneuvers. Since most of them could already ride and
shoot effectively, little practice in these arts proved necessary. However,
they did require some training in using their sabers, which resembled Roman
short swords rather than long, slightly curved weapons. The soldiers also col-
lected locally available equipment for the expedition, such as wagons and horses,
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and awaited the arrival of other vital items, such as cannon, from the East,
Meanwhile General Kearny sent detachments of dragoons along the Santa Fe Trail
to inform traders of the war and halt their caravans until after his passage.
While most of the merchants obeyed these instructions, at least one train, which
carried rifles and ammunition, never received the message. The Mexicans ar-
rested the teamsters and confiscated the weapons near Chihuahua after Kearny
captured Santa Fe.
By late June sufficient supplies had been collected and the volunteers
trained enough to make passable soldiers for "The Army of the West" , as Kearny's
force was designated, to begin its invasion. Further delay would only give
the Mexicans more time to organize opposition and make travel across the plains
more difficult, since it would take place at the height of summer when the heat
was most intense. To conserve water and forage along the trail, Kearny divided
his command into sections, with a day or two between the departure of each one.
Companies A and D left on the 22nd, followed by LtC. Ruff with B, C, F and G
on the 24th. Doniphan marched out with E, H and the infantry on the 25th.
Finally, Kearny led the remaining unit out of Leavenworth on June 30th. The
supply train with a guard of volunteers had gone in advance of the first com-
panies to have fresh rations waiting along the road. All sections had orders
to rendezvous at Bent's Fort on the Arkansas River to rest and consolidate for
the final advance into Mexican territory.
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No events of great importance occurred during this march, yet it provided
valuable experience for the volunteers. During the 900-mile trip to Santa Fe
through the relatively treeless, rolling grassland, they learned to work together
in a military fashion and became toughened by the trail's hardships. They
learned to withstand excessive heat, sudden storms, hunger and thirst. The
latter two proved expecially troublesome, despite, or perhaps because of, Kearny's
sending the supply train in advance of the troops. Frequently part of the col-
umn feasted while those who had not reached supply points starved. However,
these difficulties prepared the men for similar inconveniences which they would
encounter in Mexico. They also learned to discern the proper route of march
(twice units got lost and headed for Oregon, but scouts intercepted and brought
2b
them back) and to haul wagons over difficult terrain. In this capacity they
cut passages down stream banks, built bridges, pushed stuck wagons out of soft
ground and repaired them when they broke down.
5 This hard work proved inval-
uable when they had to perform similar tasks in Mexico. Finally, the journey
acquainted the volunteers with death, as some weaker soldiers fell ill or drowned
while crossing rivers. This lessened the chance of a decline in morale when
battle losses occurred in the future, something which occasionally happened
with raw troops.
On July 29th, the Army began arriving at Bent's Fort. There the troops
rested and refurbished their equipment for three days, while Kearny and his
officers gathered intelligence on conditions in New Mexico and planned their
future operations. Spies reported that the common people favored the Americans,
but that Governor Manuel Armijo had determined to resist and was gathering an
army. Kearny sent them back into the region to discourage opposition by pro-
claiming that the Americans would respect Mexican rights. On August 2nd the
Army followed and invaded Mexican territory, at the tiny village of Lower Moro.
The capture of New Mexico became an unqualified American success. Despite
reports of forces gathering against them, the troops met no organized resistance.
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As they occupied each village, Kearny summoned the inhabitants,
promised to
respect their rights and protect them from the Indians, and then
had the local
officials swear allegience to the United States. Only once did
battle seem
imminent, when Kearny learned that from 2000 to 3000 Mexicans had
fortified
Apache Pass (now Raton Pass), through which he would have to march to
reach
Santa Fe. However, instead of defending this formidible position,
Governor
Armijo and the regulars fled toward Chihuahua, while the rest of the force simply
melted away. On August 18th the Americans entered Santa Fe and
declared New
Mexico officially conquered.
Until that point in time, Doniphan and his men had played only a
minor
role in operations which easily captured one of the major objectives of American
expansionism, and one for which the Missourians had a special interest.
Now
their status began to change. First, Kearny ordered Doniphan
to codify the
local laws and use them as a basis for drawing up a new territorial
constitution,
tasks which Doniphan and some assistants performed quickly. He
also informed
the colonel that the Missourians would occupy New Mexico while
he led the rest
of the army to conquer California. When reinforcements then
enroute from Mis-
souri arrived, Doniphan's men were to proceed south to assist General
John Wool,
the commander of the force aimed at Chihuahua, in capturing that
city.
The reason for sending the Missourians to Chihuahua remains unclear.
Kearny
does not seem to have received orders to detach troops to Wool's
assistance,
?6
yet he promised to do so shortly after capturing Santa Fe. Nor does
any ac-
count state that Wool requested such aid, although he did have difficulty
gather-
ing and organizing his troops. Bad roads which delayed troop arrivals and
the
indiscipline of the volunteers caused these problems. Lacking other evidence,
the most reasonable explanation seems to be that Kearny learned of Wool's
trouble
and, realizing that he had more men than he needed to garrison New Mexico,
decided to send the excess to augment Wool's manpower. The ease with which
New Mexico fell probably supported this belief, since Kearny could assume that
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the inhabitants would give the occupying forces little trouble, and therefore
he would require fewer troops for that purpose. Since he expected sea-borne
reinforcements in California and had to leave a garrison in New Mexico anyway,
he could not take them west with him. To do so would increase the demands on
his supplies, which might cause severe hardship during the march, and would
leave New Mexico defenseless against Indians or an enemy counterinvasion. Also,
Doniphan's garrison would protect his rear from attacks by Mexican forces from
Chihuahua. In addition, the volunteers' desire to fight Mexicans probably had
become evident to him. Left indefinitely in Santa Fe this spirit might vent
itself on the local citizenry and ruin U.S. -Mexican relations, which in turn
could lead to a revolt and American loss of the territory. Therefore sending
the volunteers to a combat zone would satisfy everyone.
Kearny started for California on September 25th, leaving Doniphan in charge
of New Mexico until Colonel Sterling Price and the replacements arrived. Further
orders in October delayed Doniphan's departure, however, for Kearny sent back
instructions to pacify the Navajos before he joined Wool. This tribe continually
terrorized Mexican settlements and had failed to meet with Kearny before he
left Santa Fe, although chiefs from the Utes and Apaches had done so and made
peace. Finding the Navajos recalcitrant and raids continuing, Kearny decided
that Doniphan must pacify them, fulfilling his promise to protect the local
citizens. Kearny hoped to avoid encumbering U.S. strength in an Indian campaign,
leaving the region open to a counterstrike from Mexico.
VJhile the Missourians had had some activity rounding up Indians for the
earlier conference, this represented their first independent campaign, so Don-
iphan tried to plan it as effectively as possible. He divided his regiment
into three columns and sent them into Navajo country from different directions
in late October. Major Gilpin took two companies west and then south, while
Colonel Jackson (who had replaced Ruff when the latter received a regular army
commission) led three companies into the southernmost Navajo grounds and Doniphan
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marched the remaining three units into the heart of Indian country. To increase
their speed the columns used mules instead of wagons to haul their few supplies.
With no tents, the clothing they wore and little food, the volunteers suffered
greatly from the cold of early winter, yet still managed to penetrate most of
the Navajo lands. The Indians presented no resistance and obeyed the soldiers'
orders to gather at Ojo Oso (Bear Spring) to talk peace. Here, on November 22nd,
three/fourths of the tribe met with Doniphan, and fourteen chiefs signed a treaty
with the American government. ' Although this did not stop all of their depre-
dations, it gave the illusion of doing so, and thus satisfied Kearny's require-
ments. Doniphan withdrew from the Navajo country and reunited his force at
Valverde, south of Santa Fe, for the march to Chihuahua. His men had traveled
300 miles through mountainous terrain to accomplish their first mission.
Although minor in itself the Navajo campaign further prepared Doniphan's
men for their major task. The severe cold and short rations helped accustom
them to operating under adverse conditions, while further increasing their stam-
ina and toughness. More importantly, it gave some indication of Doniphan's
military ability. His use of scattered columns to comb the Navajo region proved
highly successful if the number of Indians at the conference is accurate. This
technique would later become standard military practice in dealing with Plains
Indians, as the Little Big Horn and Crook's Apache campaigns show. Doniphan
had sound tactical knowledge which would prove useful against the Mexicans. If
he did not stop the Navajo raids, he at least reduced their frequency for a
while, and thereby strengthened America's hold on the region. Even if the Mis-
sourians had yet to fire a hostile shot, they proved adept at accomplishing
their objectives. So far they had expended their entire effort to capture and
hold the seemingly valuable New Mexican region. Having done this easily, they
were willing to continue on to Chihuahua, in hopes of capturing all of Northern
Mexico and inflicting revenge on the enemy for insults Americans had suffered.
Chapter 2:
The First March and First Battle
The troops that gathered at Valverde in early December were no longer the
same fervent volunteers who had left Missouri. Disease had already several,
while Indians had slain a few of the pickets. The march to Santa Fe and the
subsequent Navajo expedition had inured the survivors to the rigors of campaign-
ing. In addition, Doniphan had received reinforcements from Santa Fe in the
form of 95 men under Captain Hudson. Colonel Price, who had arrived and was
in command of Santa Fe, sent this force to escort Lieutenant Colonel David
Mitchell to Chihuahua to open communication with General Wool, whom Price be-
lieved was already in that city. Upon discovering that Doniphan had already
begun his advance, this unit, which styled itself the "Chihuahua Rangers", joined
him and placed itself under his command.
Already the entire regiment had begun to suffer from deprivations. Although
the troops had been under arms six months, they had received no pay, although
a government paymaster had arrived. Doniphan took the blame for this. The
paymaster had come equipped only with government drafts, which most Mexicans
refused toaccept in exchange for goods, for fear that Mexican forces would pun-
ish them if they reconquered the area. Therefore, Doniphan refused to allow
his men to be paid in what he called "worthless paper", but insisted on waiting
until a supply of solid coin arrived. Since Missouri was a state where specie
dominated the economy, Doniphan may also have had an innate distrust of scrip.
As a result, the troops bartered for their needs, even to the extent of trading
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buttons for parched corn, or taking supplies by force. A small minority of
the men had received a long-delayed clothing allowance in November, the first
pay any of the expedition had received.
The troops also suffered from a dearth of military supplies. Besides the
food shortage, which they alleviated by forage and barter, the Missourians
needed tents and new uniforms, items which the government had failed to supply
28
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and which the soldiers could not purchase from the local settlers. The cold
of coming winter underlined' these particular deficiencies, as snowfalls became
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more frequent and ice appeared in the Rio Grande. * Eventually the men evident-
ly acquired tents, since contemporary sources mention them prior to Sacramento,
and they supplemented their uniforms with bartered Mexican clothing. For the
present, however, they merely overcame the cold as best they could. This gave
the entire force a ragged, unmilitary appearance which the volunteers' natural
disorder and indiscipline further emphasized.
Under these conditions, far from home in a conquered country, one might
have expected these citizen-soldiers to refuse to undertake further campaigning.
Even regular troops seldom conducted large operations in the winter, although
they had begun to do so with greater frequency. However, Doniphan's men never
seem to have objected to continued action. Their hardiness as frontiersmen,
support of the war and eagerness to come to grips with the Mexicans sustained
them through difficulties which would have discouraged men with less enthusiasm
for their cause. The fact that they intended to march south to warmer weather
also may have contributed to their enthusiasm for advancing. As a result, the
Missourians remained an effective combat force, poised and ready to spring at
the Mexicans,
Doniphan himself arrived at the Valverde encampment on December 12th, and
immediately set into motion the advance on Chihuahua. The first obstacle was
the dreaded 90 mile Jornada del Muerto or "Journey of Death" between Valverde
and the village of Dona Anna. ^ Below Valverde the Rio Grande curved west and
made a large loop before turning back southeast toward El Paso. The Jornada
cut across the base of this loop instead of following the river, thus shortening
the time and distance to Dona Anna. However, it had a reputation as a nearly
waterless wasteland which would kill an unprepared party.
Doniphan divided his force into three detachments and sent them along the
trail two days apart. First, this allowed stragglers time to rejoin the regiment
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at Valverde. More importantly, it conserved the sparse resources along the
Jornada , by not overusing the few waterholes and allowing them time to refill
between parties. This, in turn would increase the entire regiment's chances
of making the trip with minimum hardship. The first detachment of 300 men under
Major Gilpin left on the lMh, followed by Colonel Jackson and 200 men on the
16th. Doniphan and the remaining troops, including Captain Hudson's force which
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had arrived the day before, departed on the 18th.
At some point during these movements a large body of traders also advanced
with the troops. They had been encamped at Valverde since Governor Angel Trias
of Chihuahua had threatened to confiscate the goods and imprison any American
traders who failed to hire Mexican workers or pay the heavy taxes he had estab-
lished. ' Mexican officials at El Paso had arrested a deputation of five trad-
ers who went to negotiate, and sent them to Chihuahua for imprisonment. As
a result, the remainder waited to move with Doniphan's advance so that they
could have his protection against similar incidents.
The trip through the Jornada proved less fearsome than its reputation.
The first detachment found only one waterhole a few miles from the trail at
the end of the first day's march, but most of the troops carried enough water
with them to make the journey safely. Those who suffered most were the men
who had filled their canteens with whiskey instead of water. After emptying
these the first day, they marched under the miseries of drunkenness and alcohol-
induced thirst. A freak rainstorm, which rarely occurred during that season,
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saved another section which had used up its water. The men suffered more
from cold and continual marching than from thirst. The elevation (li miles
above sea level) and the winter weather produced temperatures close to Fah-
renheit. The only available plants were grama grass and soap plant, neither
of which made a good fire. Without tents or fires the troops felt the cold
keenly, but had no choice except to continue. They marched continually until
well after dark, rested a few hours and. then marched on at sunrise. They trav-
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eled thus for three days until they reached Dona Anna, averaging 30
miles a
day. That the Missourians made it without loss is a tribute
to their hardihood;
and except for the cold they made no complaint.
Doniphan reunited his command at Dona Anna and allowed it to rest
while
he replenished his supplies and gathered intelligence about the
enemy. The
local inhabitants proved quite friendly, supplying the Americans
with food,
drink and the information that more than 700 Mexicans with artillery
awaited
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him further down the river.
Governor Trias had not been idle while Doniphan was winding up his
Navajo
campaign and preparing to advance. Shortly after the war began, when
Chihuahua
became obvious as a possible military target, he asked the national
government
for assistance. 37 In response he received 1000 muskets and the
services of
General Jose Heredia to organize the defenses. Lacking more substantial
mili-
tary equipment, Trias appealed to the citizens and discovered a strong
local
spirit of resistance. The people contributed generously to a loan
to finance
military operations, helped establish a foundry for casting cannon and
brought
in weapons for the troops, which the captured American wagons filled
with muskets
supplemented. Volunteers joined the newly-formed militia units, where they
received donated clothing and learned rudimentary drill. With the support
of
neighboring states, by December Trias managed to raise 4000 men and several
cannons, plus some unorganized groups of rancheros. He then sent 1500
men
to El Paso to protect it from the now threatening gringos.
El Paso's attitude, however, was quite different from that of Chihuahua.
American trade had created strong sentiment for annexation there which made
determined resistance difficult. American partisans accused the Mexican govern-
ment of planning to sacrifice the city by withdrawing the troops and thus let
the gringos take revenge for any prior hostility. This charge had received
substantial support in September when Trias instructed the local government
to abandon the city and fight a guerrilla campaign. The people disobeyed the
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order, but it caused a further decline in morale. When an expedition marched
against Doniphan from El Paso in October, the officers quietly encouraged in-
mt
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subordination among the men, which caused it to turn back after reaching Dona
Anna. Upon its return no one showed any inclination to punish this mutiny.
-
By the time Doniphan reached Dona Anna, the local Mexican forces -- approx-
imately 2000 men and four guns — had divided into two sohools of thought con-
cerning further resistance. Some proposed not to fight hard when the Americans
arrived, while others preferred not to fight at all. The latter camp contained
most of the local garrisons and National Guards (militia), who made up a large
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part of the army. It also included the commanding officer, Colonel Gauno Cuilty.
Just as he was preparing to advance he became ill with what his personal surgeon
diagnosed as brain fever. Following the latter' s advice, Cuilty departed im-
mediately for Chihuahua, with his surgeon in attendance. Considering his atti-
tude toward the Americans, the possibility that his illness was either faked
or less serious than diagnosed seems likely. By falling ill he could avoid
the conflict between government orders and his own inclination in dealing with
the advancing Missourians. Following his departure Lieutenant Colonel Luis
Vidal took command. His solution to the difficulty was to advance three miles
from El Paso, build a fort and then send a detachment forward under his second
in command, Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Ponce de Leon, to attack Doniphan.
Meanwhile the rested Missourians left Dona Anna on the 23rd of December
and advanced toward El Paso. They encountered several Mexican scouts, but no
organized resistance. Nevertheless the frontiersmen became more nervous as
they advanced deeper into hostile country. Night guards fired at every movement
in the shadows, disturbing the men's sleep. Yet the volunteers still continued
to hope for a battle with the Mexicans soon, confident of their ability to defeat
them.
On Christmas Day, 1846, after a short holiday celebration in the morning,
Doniphan's men marched about 15 miles and then began to set up camp at Brazito.
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This was a point where the Rio Grande split for a short distance, forming a
small island. Since one of the river's branches was smaller than the other,
the Mexicans had given the place the name Brazito, or "little arm". Some of
the Missourians had a small brush with a few Mexicans, drove them off and cap-
tured a horse. Unable to decide who among them should claim it, they turned
the question over to their officers, who decided to play cards for it, each
player representing one of the soldiers involved. So while the rest of the
men turned the horses loose or scattered in search of wood and water, Doniphan
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and several officers began playing three trick loo for the horse.
In the midst of this activity some of the men observed a large dust cloud
approaching the camp, and sentries reported- to Doniphan that they had spotted
a large force of Mexicans approaching. He observed the cloud's distance and
insisted on finishing the hand, after which he ordered everyone to their posts.
Lacking time to collect the horses, the Missourians grabbed their weapons and
formed a line on foot facing the enemy, who also deployed for battle.
As the Americans finished falling in, a soldier rode out of the Mexican
lines carrying a black flag. Doniphan sent an interpreter forward to meet him,
which resulted in the following exchange:
Mexican: "The Mexican general summons your commander to
appear before him."
American: "If your general desires peace let him come here."
Mexican: "Then we shall break your ranks and take him there."
American: "Gome then and take him."
Mexican: "Curses be upon you. Prepare for a charge. We
neither ask nor give quarter.
With which the trooper wheeled his horse and galloped back to the Mexican lines.
The Missourians had formed a line parallel to the enemy with the wings
bent back toward the river to prevent them from turning their flanks and reach-
ing the camp. The traders' wagons which had already arrived formed a circle
44just behind their left wing in case a breakthrough should occur.
The Mexicans drew up with most of their cavalry, consisting of Vera Cruz
lancers and some Chihuahua and Zacatecas dragoons, on the right flank, the state
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and local militia covering the center and left, and the remainder of the dragoons
on the far left flank. The howitzer remained with the infantry in the center.
When the messenger returned, Ponce's entire force advanced against the
Americans, firing ragged volleys and cheering wildly. In contrast, Doniphan
ordered his men to lie down and withhold their fire until the enemy came within
easy range. This boosted the Mexican morale, for they believed the volunteers
who lay down had been killed by their volleys, which therefore had done terrible
execution. Unfortunately, they actually had fired so high that even the Mis-
sourians who still stood remained largely unscathed. When they were about 60
yards away Doniphan gave the command to fire.
The resulting volley was disastrous for Ponce's troops. The "dead" Amer-
icans rose up and devastated their ranks at close range. The "resurrection"
in particular unnerved them; and, when a second volley crashed from the Missour-
ians' rifles, the Mexican center and left hastily retreated with the volunteers
in hot pursuit. They overran the original Mexican line, capturing the howitzer,
but failed to catch their enemy.
On the American left events occurred in only a slightly different fashion.
The Mexican cavalry veered off from the volunteers' fire, but then swept around
their flanks and attacked the wagons. Here, however, the teamsters delivered
a volley which checked their charge. As they milled in confusion, Captain Reid
led approximately 20 mounted men in a countercharge, which broke their ranks
and drove them off. Reid pursued, but again the Americans failed to catch up,
and half an hour after the first shot the Mexicans had departed from the vicin-
ity completely, leaving their casualties and a large amount of equipment behind.
The actual numbers involved in the battle remain in dispute. Most American
accounts give the Mexican forces a range of 1000 to 1200 strong and Doniphan's
men at roughly 500. * The Mexican sources consulted, however, list their troops
at 500 and the Americans at over 700. Justin Smith and Jack Bauer, who wrote
the most respected histories of the war, accept the Mexicans' figure for their
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own forces. Yet, if one accepts the Mexican statement that Trias sent 1500
men to supplement the existing forces in the area, the American figures seem
most plausible. These reinforcements would have given Vidal an army in excess
of 2000 soldiers, which could allow him to detach 1000 under Ponce and still
have a strong force to defend El Paso. Furthermore, Mexican scouts certainly
should have given their commanders a reasonably accurate assessment of the size
of Doniphan's force. With knowledge of previous U.S. victories elsewhere, par-
ticularly Taylor's, abailable to them, the idea that Vidal and Ponce would at-
tack 900 Americans with only about half that number seems ridiculous, particu-
larly when more troops were available. The American strength of 500 weems most
acceptable since all contemporary accounts refer to fresh troops arriving during
and after the battle. The Mexican figures would require the presence of nearly
the entire American force on the battlefield.
If the number of troops involved remains subject to debate, most sources
agree on the casualty figures for Brazito. American authors usually estimate
200 Mexicans killed and wounded in a 1:3 ratio, as well as another half-dozen
prisoners. Doniphan suffered only seven men slightly wounded, all of whom
recovered. These numbers, however, do not include several Mexicans killed by
Navahos, who had watched the battle from some nearby mountains and fell upon
the retreating stragglers. Contemporary accounts also mention two Mexican
women captured while serving the howitzer, one of whom died of wounds.
Brazito was clearly an American victory. Despirt being surprised, the
volunteers quickly formed ranks and drove the Mexicans off after a brief fight,
inflicting 30 times their own casualties. Doniphan's unorthodox tactic of having
his troops lie down until the enemy came within easy range not only protected
his men, but, coupled with close range rifle volleys, demoralized the Mexicans.
The Mexicans later claimed that their cavalry had misinterpreted a bugle call
to charge as a command to retreat, and they merely carried the infantry along
with them when they retired. One suspects that this story, like the Mexican
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troop strengths, originated to reduce the sting of an extremely embarassing
defeat.
The Missourians spent the rest of Christmas Day feasting on captured sup-
lies and celebrating their victory. Perhaps the most amusing incident occurred
when Doniphan and his officers finished their interrupted card game, only to
discover that the horse they had played for had escaped during the battle.
The next morning, however, the men resumed their march in a serious frame
of mind. Learning of Vidal's army and fortification outside El Paso from the
prisoners, they expected another ambush, or at least a major battle for the
city. Doniphan again sent back to Santa Fe for artillery, having only the cap-
tured howitzer with which to bombard the fort.
Surprisingly, the expected fighting did not materialize. When the fugitives
informed Vidal of what had occurred he retreated to Chihuahua with the regulars,
while the local militia destroyed their military markings and dispersed to their
homes. A deputation of prominent citizens met Doniphan a few miles from the
city to welcome him and to offer the surrender of El Paso. Thus on December
2?th, the volunteers quietly marched through the town and encamped to the south.
They had achieved their first major objective.
Chapter J>:
El Paso and the March to Sacramento
The occupation of El Paso provided a pleasant interlude for Doniphan and
his men. At this time, the city occupied a narrow strip of land along the south
bank of the Rio Grande (present-day Juarez) and contained approximately 12,000
people. Fields and orchards covered the surrounding area, watered by artificial
streams dug from the river. In El Paso itself, trees lined the clean streets,
providing a shady, pleasing location for the volunteers to recover from their
hardships. The inhabitants* general pro-Americanism and the abundance of food
made the city seem a paradise to the trail-worn troops in their present condition.
Doniphan immediately took several steps to ensure that the occupation of
El Paso would be peaceful and beneficial to all concerned. After releasing
some Americans whom the local authorities had jailed several months earlier,
he finished arranging the surrender terms with the city's envoys and issued a
proclamation to the citizens outlining his intentions. Among other things he
promised to protect the lives and property of all people who remained neutral,
punish those who preached insurrection, to purchase all supplies required and
not to lay waste to the city. He underscored this by issuing similar orders
to his own troops, particularly regarding payment for any goods taken. Don-
iphan also encouraged the Mexicans to establish a market for his men to purchase
supplies, which would further facilitate relations between the two nationalities.
To prevent a possible uprising, Doniphan also ordered his company command-
ers to conduct a house-to-house search and confiscate any weapons found. This
put the Missourians in possession of 500 stands of small arms, 4O0 lances, 4
cannon, several light fortress guns and 20,000 pounds of powder, lead, cannon
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and musket shot. A reconnaissance to an abandoned fort 20 miles further south
returned with another cannon and several wagonloads of ammunition, Doniphan
took the cannon, powder and shot for his own use, and probably stored the small
arms under guard until after his departure.
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Doniphan's awareness that many of the inhabitants remained hostile to the
United States justified this search, which went beyond normal precautions taken
in Santa Fe. Some of those who had remained in the city hid their true feelings,
while plotting to revolt against the occupation. In this endeavor they received
advice and encouragement from Chihuahua. After the Missourians learned of the
revolt which took place in New Mexico in early January, they watched suspected
plotters more closely and soon received enough evidence to justify the arrest
of several of them. The most prominent of these was the local curate, Esther
Ramon Ortiz. Doniphan had these men imprisoned during the remainder of his
stay in El Paso. With their influence gone, tension relaxed and both sides
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continued to fraternize harmoniously.
Shortly after arriving in El Paso, Doniphan learned some information of
extreme importance: Wool had not arrived at Chihuahua and never would. His
army had started out well enough, but Taylor had ordered it to halt at Monclova,
nearly 300 miles from its objective, because an armistice he had agreed to for-
bade further American advances. This enforced stop grated on both the discip-
linarian Wool and his rowdy volunteers, who objected to his intensive drills.
When he received word that the Mexicans at Chihuahua had marched to join Santa
Anna, Wool asked Taylor for permission to join him. He felt that no reason
existed for continuing to Chihuahua if there was no enemy there for him to fight,
which to him and his men was the whole purpose of the war. Eventually, when
in December, 1846, Taylor ordered Wool to join him, the latter did so with alac-
rity, and the main thrust against Chihuahua ceased to exist.
This news naturally had a great impact on Doniphan. Kearny had given him
orders to join Wool at Chihuahua, but since Wool never would reach that city,
he could not carry them out. More importantly, Wool had not neutralized or
distracted Trias' military forces, which could now concentrate their full strength
against the Missourians, wh6 could expect no significant support from either
Santa Fe or from Taylor at Monterrey. If they continued on to Chihuahua they
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would face every soldier Trias could gather, which certainly would outnumber
their force greatly. If they remained in El Paso, the Mexicans probably would
attack them there, thus merely delaying the confrontation. In any event, Wool's
failure left Doniphan hanging at the end of a tenuous line of communication
on the border of hostile territory, with no prospect of assistance. Therefore,
he needed to make a decision quickly concerning his next move.
The Missourians' reaction to this news shows their attitude toward the
war and Doniphan's understanding of them. After pondering the information and
discussing it with his officers, Doniphan summoned a mass meeting of the vol-
unteers and conveyed the problem to them. He then put to a vote the issue of
whether the expedition should continue to Chihuahua, remain at El Paso, or return
to Santa Fe. Military logic dictated one of the latter two courses. The whole
purpose of the march had been to join Y/ool, which now seemed impossible. Fur-
thermore, Doniphan had only a small force poised on hostile territory, which
the Mexicans could annihilate easily if they concentrated their strength. Fi-
nally, the men's enlistments would expire in a few months, so why risk their
lives on an objective which seemed to serve no purpose.
Nevertheless the volunteers had different ideas. They had enlisted to
fight Mexicans, and the battle of Brazito had given them a belief in their own
invincibility. Therefore they scorned the dangers of continuing on in their
eagerness to meet the enemy again. Also, they felt that they had a job to do
in capturing Chihuahua, and they hated to leave it uncompleted. Almost unani-
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mously they voted to continue the march. Accordingly, Doniphan sent back
another request for artillery support and planned to resume the advance after
its arrival.
Undoubtedly this was the most momentous decision of the expedition. Had
the men voted to discontinue the advance or had Doniphan arbitrarily ordered
such an action, the expedition probably would have received little historical
notice. Its sole achievement had been the capture of El Paso in the face of
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less than strong resistance, something which hardly reflected great glory on
the participants. By continuing on the volunteers added to the legends of Amer-
ican hardihood and willingness to risk danger to achieve their original objec-
tive. Besides, they had already traveled over 1000 miles, so another 300 seemed
trivial.
The events described also show that Doniphan knew how to deal with his
men. Although they seemingly indicate that he relinquished his military judge-
ment to theirs, thus avoiding responsibility for the decision, he actually recog-
nized that their opinion would influence the success of any operation he might
undertake. If he had given an order to advance or retreat, those who disagreed
with his decision probably would have created difficulties — disobeyed orders
or weakened morale through criticism of his move. Certainly they would not
put their full effort into completing the mission, which would jeopardize its
success. By putting the issue to a vote, he played upon the men's belief in
democracy and personal independence. This also showed his recognition of the
fact that the volunteers disliked arbitrary commands and liked to have an input
into important decisions. By catering to these he greatly reduced the possi-
bility of a threat to his authority and retained disciplinary control over his
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command.
As mentioned earlier, the stay in El Paso generally proved enjoyable for
all concerned. Mexicans, merchants and soldiers traded briskly with each other
without incident. In addition, a great deal of socializing took place between
the occupation force and the natives, particularly after high winds and the
resulting dust storms forced the soldiers to move their quarters into the city
early in January. Parties and balls occurred frequently, both sides exchanged
numerous social visits and gambling went on constantly, frequently blocking
traffic on the streets. Doniphan forbade public gambling and the sale of liquor
after a knife brawl between two of his lieutenants resulted in one seriously
wounding the other, but beyond this he encouraged fraternization. Curiously
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enough, this fight is the only violent incident most contemporary writers men-
tion during the entire occupation. Evidently, the Mexicans avoided antagonizing
their conquerors (the widespread pro-American sentiment undoubtedly aided in
this), and the soldiers generally behaved themselves.
This does not mean that incidents did not occur. Rumors of large Mexican
forces approaching the city circulated frequently, usually started by the anti-
American faction in order to encourage the gringos to retreat. Several times
the soldiers conducted thorough patrols of the surrounding area in response
to these false alarms, but as time passed they became fewer and the troops paid
less attention to them.
One confrontation between the two cultures stands out, showing Doniphan's
awareness of his limitations in dealing with his men. A Mexican came to him
one day to complain about a soldier who had stolen his pig, and even identified
the offender. When Doniphan asked the trooper if the charge were true, he re-
plied that it was and demanded to know what the Colonel intended to do about
it. Doniphan hesitated a moment, then replied: "Well, I don't know unless
I come and help you to eat it". The Mexican received no redress, which some
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of the men who heard the exchange felt was most unjust. Evidently this affair
did not affect U.S. -Mexican relations adversely, since no contemporary accounts
mention any native reprisals.
This exchange indicates that, although Doniphan attempted to treat the
local Mexicans fairly, he knew he could not act too overbearing toward his men
in matters of discipline. Despite his orders against looting, if he had pun-
ished this soldier he probably would have alienated some of his men, who would
have seen the theft as merely taking necessary food from an enemy. Like most
armies, they could see little reason to protect civilians' property which they
needed for their own use in wartime, and being volunteers they would object
more strenuously to it than regular troops. Had Doniphan, an elected officer,
forced the issue, his men probably would have become more ill-disciplined, re-
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fused to obey his orders, and he would have had great difficulty controlling
them. The fact that the records mention only this one incident suggests that
most of the Missourians treated the Mexicans fairly and obeyed Doniphan's orders.
Perhaps he felt that he could afford to be lenient in rare, isolated cases.
Also, he may have believed that he needed to depend on the troops' obedience
if one of the rumors of approaching enemies turned out to be true. No record
exists of a change in relations between the different nationalities after the
incident, so the Mexicans evidently did not become too upset.
Around the first of February, the long-awaited artillery finally arrived:
six guns under the command of Major Meriwether Lewis Clark, son of William Clark.
Price had delayed their departure when the revolt broke out in Santa Fe, which
cost the lives of several Americans, and even after he suppressed it he refused
to send as many guns as Doniphan had asked for. Still, it was more than Don-
iphan had had to begin with, so he determined to advance on Chihuahua without
further delay. On February 8th, after destroying some of the captured cannon
and shot, the volunteers resumed their march toward their final objective.
The column included slightly over 900 effective soldiers; approximately 300
traders organized into two companies under Samuel Owens, a prominent merchant;
Clark's six guns, plus the larger captured Mexican pieces; and the subversive
prisoners from El Paso, particularly Father Ortiz. Approximately 312 wagons
carried the army supplies, the traders' merchandise, and the arms confiscated
at El Paso.
This march of 300 miles proved less arduous than the journey to El Paso,
since the Missourians were better prepared for the difficulties, but some unique
events occurred. The trip through the Jornada del Muerto had taught them how
to prepare for the two long waterless stretches they faced, but the hot weather
mentioned in their diaries caused them to suffer from thirst more, despite the
abundance of water they carried. Also, Mexican detachments appeared more fre-
quently than on the former journey, and their presence required the men to watch
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more carefully for an ambush. Yet their former trials had tempered the Mis-
sourians, giving them a greater awareness of what they faced, so they operated
with greater discipline than previously.
Before the expedition left the Rio Grande and entered the desert, however,
difficulties arose with some of the traders. First, two of them who were using
British passports evaded the camp guards one night and hastened to Chihuahua
with 45 wagons full of goods." This defection violated Doniphan's orders for
all merchants to remain with the army, orders which they all had promised to
obey. Although the factor behind the men's departure probably was their desire
to increase their profits, rather than any designs of betrayal, they undoubtedly
provided Trias with information concerning Doniphan's advance. He would cer-
tainly have questioned them thoroughly upon their arrival at Chihuahua which
they could not have concealed.
The second incident involved two Mexican traders named Porus and Harmony,
who had joined the party. Aware of Trias' vast military preparations to destroy
the Americans and therefore expecting Doniphan's imminent defeat, they feared
reprisals for their membership in the group and attempted to turn back to El
Paso. Here they intended either to sell their merchandise or await the outcome
of the impending battle, after which they would arrive in Chihuahua hailing
the victors. Colonel Mitchell led a small force to compel them to rejoin the
party, but the two men claimed that Indians had run off their mules, thus im-
mobilizing their wagons. When Mitchell threatened to hang them, however, they
revealed where they had hidden the mules to undertake this deception. The trad-
ers re-hitched the animals to the wagons and returned to the main body, where
Doniphan had them watched closely for the rest of the trip.
Following these events, the army turned away from the river on February
14th, after resting there for a day, and began the first Jornada of 65 miles.
Knowing from previous experience that thirst would be a major problem, the troops
carefully filled their canteens before leaving. Several soldiers who lacked
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canteens or desired an extra margin of safety, even filled their saber sheaths,
letting the weapons hang naked from their belts. Even with these precautions
the .Jornada proved arduous. Hot days alternated with freezing nights, which
the men could not relieve because fuel for fires was lacking in the region.
The deep sand along the trail frequently caused the wagons to bog down, thus
requiring double or quadruple teams of animals, and men pushing on the wheels,
to keep them moving. Thirst ravaged the regiment to such an extent that some
party members offered as high as ten dollars and a team of mules for a drink
of water. Father Ortiz endeared himself to many of the sufferers by providing
them with water from thelarge quantities that he had stored in his buggy before
leaving the river. Many animals collapsed from dehydration and were abandoned.
These conditions lasted for three days, until the troops reached Laguna (lake)
de los Patos. Even then the wagon train bogged down ten miles from the lake,
when the animals could pull the wagons no further. Doniphan ordered the rear
guard on to the lake to bring back water for them. While the teamsters waited,
however, a sudden rainstorm in the nearby mountains flooded the plain, refresh-
ing the group enough to allow them to push on.
By February 18th, the entire expedition had reunited at the lake and went
into camp to recover from its ordeal. Several men had died from disease since
the party had left El Paso, and at least one died from overdrinking after ar-
riving at the lake. Also, the traders had abandoned a great deal of merchandise
and supplies during the .Jornada in order to lighten their loads. The heaviest
57loss was four tons of flour and a large quantity of salt. Fortunately, no
Mexican force appeared to threaten the march, although Doniphan had feared such
an occurrence and had kept the columns as close together as he could. During
the Jornada he even ordered the wagons brought closer to the main body for better
protection against possible attacks. Numerous scouting parties which he sent
out show Doniphan's awareness of his vulnerability. The moment the march had
begun, his flank had been exposed to attack from the neighboring state of Sonora,
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and rumors indicated a Mexican force was gathering there for just that purpose. ?
More importantly, information indicated that Governor Trias was raising an army
to stop the gringos and that the local population had become actively hostile.
Signal fires in the hills lent support to these rumors.
After resting overnight, the Missourians left the lake and marched to the
village of Carrizal. The advance guard had captured it a few days earlier and
accepted the submission of the townspeople, so Doniphan's formal occupation
occurred peacefully. The only untoward incident happened that night, when a
windstorm blew down most of the soldiers' tents, thus leaving them scrambl ig
in the dark trying to capture and re -erect the elusive canvas. The inhabi nts
proved quite friendly, but whether this showed actual pro-American sentime t
or fear of the Missourians and a desire for their protection against Indi? S
(an ever present threat in this region) remains unreported. Probably all lese
elements joined to form the local Mexican attitude.
From Carrizal the expedition advanced to the hot springs Ojo Caliente,
arriving there on February 21st. Here Doniphan ordered a halt to rest and pre-
pare for crossing the last Jornada before Chihuahua. While the men bathed in
the refreshing, warm water and prepared rations for the next march, he sent
a scouting party forward to Laguna de Encinillas, his next major goal. Intel
-
.
ligence indicated that a large body of Mexicans waited on the Americans there,
so Doniphan wished to ascertain their disposition before he arrived.
Advancing from Ojo Caliente through the treeless, grassy prairie, the troops
found the final Jornada relatively uneventful. Again they suffered from the
extreme heat of the day alternating with the cold nights, but waterholes began
appearing after two days, so thirst did not become a problem. However, home-
sickness ravaged the column for the first time. M.B. Edwards reported that
one frequently heard men promising "never to return to Mexico", "never do another
voluntary act", or just wishing for a home-cooked meal. Fortunately, they
restricted themselves to griping and did not voice any loud complaints or threat
X?
en mutiny.
As the expedition reached Laguna de Encinillas, on the 25th, a new danger
threatened it: fire. One of the previous evening's campfires had raged out
of control, and, joining with a similar fire from an earlier campsite, raced
across the grassy plain toward the column. Attempts to outrun it proved futile,
so the frontiersmen began to use every trick they knew to stop the flames.
While the drivers drove the artillery and ammunition wagons into the lake, the
cavalry dismounted and cut a wide swath in the grass. Other men built backfires.
Eventually these tactics proved successful and the fire burned itself out, ut
the Missourians had to encamp on the barren, blackened terrain, which prov ed
no forage for the animals.
At the south end of the lake stood Governor Trias' hacienda . The Amer ^ans
had accurate reports that ?00 Mexican troops occupied it, and had driven c
its large animal herds to deprive the volunteers of them. Doniphan deters led
to attack this force, so Captain Reid volunteered to lead 25 men on an explor-
atory reconnaissance of its positions. This party gained the ranch without
meeting the enemy, but discovered its walls prevented them from seeing inside.
Therefore, in a bold effort to accomplish his mission, Captain Reid led a cav-
alry charge through the gate into the compound. Here he discovered that the
Mexicans had departed to rejoin their main army, leaving only the household
servants. After rounding up a few stray cattle, Reid rejoined the main column,
which continued its advance unimpeded.
On February 2?th, Doniphan received positive reports that the Mexicans
awaited him entrenched along the Sacramento River. Scouts reconnoitered the
position to discover the number of troops and the location of their artillery
batteries, which they reported to Doniphan. They also clashed with Mexican
scouts and captured a few horses, but neither side sustained any casualties.
The Mexicans had not remained idle during Doniphan's month-long advance. The
loss of El Paso increased their anger against the American invaders and resulted
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in redoubled efforts to prepare to defeat them, especially after the survivors
of Brazito reached the city with their tale of disaster. Under the leadership
of Governor Trias and Commandent-General Heredia, the remaining pro-Yankee senti-
ment disappeared as the people gathered additional troops and equipment. House-
holders produced more old weapons and ammunition, the churches gave up their
bells for Trias to cast into more cannon, and everyone donated clothing for
uniforms. Volunteers flocked in th join new militia units. To pay the men
and cover the cost of equipment, Trias borrowed from the local landowners, thus
successfully meeting all of his expenses. The militia underwent further training
to learn how to use their unfamiliar weapons. Everywhere a spirit of confi once
and victory prevailed, as the citizens proudly viewed the results of their exer-
tions. Soon they would march north, drive out the gringos and free El Past
Then they would sweep on and free New Mexico. Confidence was so great that
the leaders planned to capture Doniphan's entire force, strip them of their
possessions, bind them and march them to Mexico City. Trias even had a large
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quantity of rope cut to suitable lengths for this purpose.
On February 10th, General Garcia Conde, fresh from the battle of Monterrey,
arrived and received command of the cavalry. Shortly afterward, he took 700
horsemen north with orders to observe the Americans' advance and attack them
if he could do so wihtout causing a general engagement. ' He advanced to Laguna
de Encinillas, learned of Doniphan's approach and fell back south slowly, keep-
ing contact with the enemy. This certainly was the force that fled Trias'
hacienda shortly before Reid's attack.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Mexicans fortified their chosen battlefield
at Sacramento Pass. Here the El Paso-Chihuahua road crossed a peninsula formed
by the dry Arroyo Seco connecting with the Sacramento River. On this peninsula,
a high hill dominated the eastern side of the road, while a broad plateau flanked
it to the west. On the northeast corner of this hill (its highest point, called
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Cerro Frijoles) the Mexicans built a fortified battery. They also erected two
other batteries on the hill's northwestern spurs, and two on its southwest cor-
ner. The northern batteries covered a secondary road running along the Arroyo
Seco to its junction with the Scaramento crossing. Along the whole western
crest between the batteries, Heredia built entrenchments which covered the road's
entire length. Breastworks also connected the northern batteries. A stone
wall and entrenchments protected the hill's eastern face, while an abatis blocked
the secondary road under the Frijoles battery. The main Mexican camp rested
in a depression in the center of this hill, concealed from the Americans' view.
In addition to these preparations, Heredia built breastworks connecting
the hill with the river, thus covering the road, and one blocking the El Paso
road itself on the plateau just south of the arroyo. He erected a final bat
tery on the ridge of Cerro Sacramento hill south of the river, which overlooked
the ford, and partially fortified Rancho Sacramento, a hacienda guarding the
ford. Breastworks blocking the road from Rancho Torreon, west of the plateau
on the river's south bank, to Chihuahua completed the fortifications.
To arm and man the works Heredia had ten field pieces, ranging from 4-pound-
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ers to 9-pounders, and six light culverins (rampart guns). ' His troops num-
bered approximately 4000 men, including Conde's detachment. This number con-
sisted of 1200 cavalry, 1200 infantry, 300 gunners and 1400 rancheros using
only lances and machetes. Numerically this was a formidible force, and if
it lacked weapons, it had high morale. When the Americans arrived, the defenders
would show their prowess.
When completed, Heredia' s defenses provided a seemingly insurmountable
obstacle to the Americans' advance. If they overcame the breastwork blocking
the main road and continued marching along it, the hilltop fortifications would
rake their entire flank and decimate them. If they turned east along the arroyo,
the abatis would delay them while the northern batteries pounded their ranks.
Should they turn west and make for Torreon, the entrenchments on that road would
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halt them until the main Mexican body fell on their flanks and rear. If the
Missourians tried to storm the fortifications, they would have to charge uphill
against men protected by prepared works, usually a disadvantageous attacking
condition involving high casualties. In short, no matter which way the volun-
teers went, if they tried to cross the river in this area they would suffer
heavy losses, thus making them easy prey for the Mexicans. Heredia's superior-
ity in numbers and artillery further weighted the odds in his favor, since he
could do more damage to the Americans than they could do to him, in terms of
firepower. Doniphan could outflank the defenses, of course, by making a long
circuitious march, but the time involved would allow Heredia to shift to a block-
ing position. With the evident advantages of men, morale and position the Mi
x-
icans should defend their lines easily, in spite of any standard military man-
euver.
For their part, Doniphan and his men had accomplished a great deal in their
occupation of El paso and the march south. They had defused a potentially hostile
city with fair treatment, thus securing their communications„ The Americans
certainly promoted annexation, but many of the populace also supported it.
By trading freely and encouraging fraternization, Doniphan produced an air of
goodwill which reduced hostile confrontations. Although some of the troops
considered the Mexicans inferior, no reports of trouble because of this seem
to exist. In their march the men penetrated deep into hostile territory, over-
coming the natural dangers of weather, thirst and fire rather than human foes.
After the short stay in El Paso, to which they easily could have returned, such
a feat is a tribute to their endurance and perseverance.
Doniphan's decision to march south, however, does not appear justifiable.
He was entering a hostile region of which he had little intelligence, facing
an enemy of unknown size and exposing his flanks and rear to attack. He left
behind a peaceful city, but it could turn hostile at any moment, thus cutting
off his communication. Military sense indicated that he should have returned
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to Santa Fe and from there taken his troops where they would be more useful to
the war effort. Failing this, he should have remained in El Paso and kept the
region pacified. Doniphan risked his entire force on the basis of their eager-
ness to go on and his lack of alternative instructions. Yet, like other officers
in similar situations, he weighed the choices and implemented the one which
seemed likely to prove most effective against the enemy. He held the respon-
sibility for war events in his region and needed to ensure his own success.
He had a regiment anxious to fight and who could beat the Mexicans easily, based
on previous battles involving either his own force or other American units.
By remaining in El Paso, the men would become restless and trouble might erupt.
By retreating they would give up El Paso, the fruits of their victory, to Trias,
who would surely come north to retake it. Also, their enlistments would expire
in June, probably too soon to get the men reassigned to perform any useful
functions. According to these considerations, Doniphan was using "combat ready"
men in the best possible way, and depending on their hardihood and eagerness
to fight to overcome all opposition. Such a solution frequently produces more
tangible results than military sense.
Chapter 4:
The Conquest of Chihuahua
Knowing that a battle was imminent, Doniphan adopted a unique formation
to approach the Sacramento works. He formed the wagons in four parallel columns
of approximately equal length. In the space between the two interior columns
he placed Major Clark's artillery, while a battalion of infantry marched in
each of the other two intervals. The three mounted troops rode in the van of
this force, protecting it from sudden attack and screening it from the enemy's
view. This organization concealed the Americans' strength and exact positions
from Mexican observers, and also had defensive advantages. The column was no
longer strung out in such a way that it was vulnerable to sudden flank attacks,
and if Heredia should go on the offensive, Doniphan could form the wagons into
a fort.
The Americans continued along the road as though they intended to pass
along the face of the Mexican entrenchments, thus exposing their flank and fall-
ing into Heredia* s trap. Suddenly, Doniphan ordered them to swing west, away
from the fortifications, while his cavalry continued to advance in order to
conceal the maneuver as long as possible. Once beyond range of the enemy's
guns, they swung south again to cross the arroyo. This in itself seemed form-
idible due to its high steep banks, but the men broke them down with tools and
then drove the teams across with much exertion and profanity, dragging the wagons
with ropes where necessary. Upon reaching the plateau on the other side, the
Missourians reformed their ranks facing the Mexican lines. Rejoined by the
cavalry, they placed the unlimbered artillery in front of their lines, while
the wagons remained in the rear with the teamsters' battalions protecting them.
This maneuver took the Mexicans by surprise. Heredia had organized his
forces to contest the arroyo crossing at the El Paso road. The cavalry had
drawn up in three ranks in front of the entrenchments in order to attack the
Americans as they attempted the crossing. The infantry, also in three ranks,
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waited in the forts to fire on the enemy as they passed. When Doniphan swung
west, the Mexican leaders concluded that he intended to cross the arroyo at
Torreon, and march on to Chihuahua, thus bypassing their positions without a
battle. Although redoubts blocked the Torreon road, Conde ordered his cavalry
to stop this escape. However, Doniphan's ruse had gained him enough time to
begin making his battle dispositions on the plateau. When they realized that
the gringos were not attempting to escape, but were willing to fight, the Mexican
cavalry halted to await infantry and artillery support. When four guns and
the accompanying foot soldiers arrived, the cavalry again advanced on the Mis-
sourians.
The cavalry's delay in attacking allowed Doniphan to complete his combat
dispositions. When the Mexicans finally charged, Major Clark's guns opened
fire with deadly accuracy, killing and wounding many of the enemy. After three
shots, the Mexicans broke and retreated a short distance. They attempted to
rally, but a fourth round from Clark's battery sent them fleeing into the re-
doubts. This unmasked the Mexican artillery, which immediately opened fire
to silence their opposite numbers, but the Americans retained the advantage.
Freak atmospheric conditions and/or inferior powder made the Mexican cannonballs
visible as they traveled through the air. The volunteers quickly became adept
at dodging these shots, and thus sustained few casualties. The wagons and teams
in the rear suffered the most damage from the cannonade. In contrast, Clark's
battery quickly dismounted one Mexican gun. It also inflicted several casual-
ties among the infantry despite problems with the American ammunition (the explo-
sive shells used tended to detonate when halfway to the target). Already
demoralized by the cavalry's retreat, the Mexicans withstood this punishment
for less than an hour, before they also fled to the entrenchments with their
guns.
As the Mexicans fell back, Doniphan ordered his entire force, except for
the wagons, to advance against the forts. His order of battle was as follows:
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Major Gilpin with the Second Battalion (dismounted) held the left, then came
the three cavalry companies under Captains Reid, Parsons and Hudson; beside
them was Clark's artillery; and finally, Lieutenant Colonels Jackson and Mitchell
commanded the First Battalion on the right flank. The Mexican artillery attempt-
ed to halt this advance, but did little damage, since the Missourians continued
to dodge their shots with alacrity. At the same time a body of enemy horsemen,
described by the Americans as released criminals, swept down on the wagon
train in Doniphan's rear. The teamsters there managed to drive them off before
they disrupted the volunteers' movement.
Near the base of the ridge Doniphan briefly halted his infantry, while
ordering the cavalry and howitzers to charge the central, most annoying battery
Initially these bodies charged bravely, but due to a misunderstanding or pos-
sible stupidity, an unidentified American officer halted them in a crossfire
some distance from the works. Here they might have suffered grievious losses,
except for Captain Reid. Not receiving the order he continued to charge with
a small force, and briefly drove the Mexicans out of the battery. In this attack,
Major Cwens, who commanded the teamsters, died charging the parapet. Several
others were wounded when the Mexicans drove Reid out of the fort.
At this crisis the rest of the Missourians stormed the entrenchments.
Supported by howitzers, the rest of Reid's company permanently recaptured the
redoubt. The infantry battalions also swarmed over the fortifications. After
a brief flurry of hand-to-hand fighting the Mexicans fled, leaving Doniphan
in possession of the western crest. The Second Battalion, assisted by some
of Clark's guns then cleaned out the northern fortifications, including the
Cerro Gordo battery, with little difficulty. Heredia's attempts to rally his
troops failed. American artillery broke up any bodies that attempted to make
a stand. Most of the Mexicans simply scattered, with the mounted volunteers
in hot pursuit.
Of the Mexican defenses, only the Sacramento redoubt remained untaken.
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It had bombarded the Missourians throughout their attack, but the distance and
angle of fire prevented it from doing any damage. As Doniphan's men cleared
the entrenchments, Heredia, in a last attempt to save the battle, ordered two
more guns up Sacramento Hill to rake their line. Through some ambiguity or
deliberate misunderstanding, all of the remaining artillery and organized in-
fantry headed for this post, thus ending any possibility of organizing a new
defense on the plateau.
67 Yet even this effort to reinforce the hill failed,
for the Americans rapidly pursued and overtook the enemy, scattering the infan-
try in all directions and capturing the guns. Then Major Clark turned his ar-
tillery on the Sacramento Redoubt, while Doniphan" s cavalry, supported by in-
fantry, charged it. In an amazing stroke of luck, Clark's first shot dismounted
one of the Mexican guns. This so demoralized the defenders that they offered
little resistance when the volunteers poured into their works.
With the Sacramento Redoubt's fall, all resistance ceased. Trias and his
generals fled south to El Parral with a few men, while the rest of the Mexicans
dispersed in all directions to avoid the vengeance of the gringos. Even the
citizens who had come to watch the battle joined the stampede. As the last
of the enemy disappeared, Doniphan rode over to Father Ortiz, who had contin-
uously prophesied that Heredia would defeat the Missourians easily and said
to him: "Well, Ortiz, what do you think about the Mexicans whipping my boys
now." Ortiz replied, "Ah! sir, they would have defeated you if you had fought
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like men, but you fought like devils."
The volunteers had indeed "fought like devils." Their spirited attack
and eagerness to close with the enemy completely broke the Mexicans. One Mis-
sourian, detailed to hold horses, abandoned his task and charged the entrench-
ments, shouting: "Hold hell in a fight! I didn't come here to hold horses
—
I can do that at home."
9 Enthusiasm such as this carried Doniphan's men through
positions which might have daunted more experienced troops.
The casualties and amount of equipment captured also bear out Father Ortiz's
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comment. Doniphan reported at least 600 Mexicans killed and wounded, plus 40
prisoners, including one bragadier-general. In contrast, the Americans lost
one man killed (Major Owens) and eleven wounded, two of them mortally. Further-
more, they captured all of the Mexican artillery and all of the equipment in
the enemy camp. This included: 50,000 sheep, 1500 cattle, 100 mules, $*] assort-
ed vehicles (among them the general's carriage), 100 stands of small arms, 100
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stands of colors, and 25,000 pounds of ammunition. The Missourians also found
among the spoils the ropes Heredia had intended to bind them with and the black
flag the Mexicans had carried at Brazito.
The casualties help to make the Battle of Sacramento a remarkable one in
military history. That a force of semi-trained men could defeat an enemy four
times their number, who had the advantages of entrenchments with artillery and
elevation, seems contrary to military logic. That such a force could win such
a decisive victory seems even more impossible. Yet, several factors combined
to bring about this astounding result. First, the Mexicans had inferior equip-
ment. Over 25 percent of them (the rancheros) had no firearms at all, and thus
were useful only as shock troops. Since the only hand-to-hand combat occurred
when the Missourians invaded the fortifications, these men probably contributed
very little to the battle. They may not even have participated at all, but
instead abandoned their posts before the Americans reached them. Also, even
the Mexicans who had guns did not use them effectively, as Doniphan's losses
indicate. Several contemporary accounts declare that they did not aim their
weapons, but merely thrust them over the parapet and fired blindly while crouch-
71ing under cover. In addition, the Mexican shoulder arms probably were of
lower quality than those the Americans used. Considering that most of them
came from the homes in Chihuahua, one suspects that they consisted mostly of
smoothbores, with a sprinkling of more modern weapons. The guns that the dis-
loyal traders had brought probably were of fairly recent manufacture, but they
made up only a small portion of those available. Certainly the possibility
58
that Heredia had a large quantity of rifles comparable to those of Doniphan's
men seems remote, since rifle production in large quantities had barely begun.
Therefore, one doubts that the average Mexican had access to such a weapon.
No concrete evidence concerning this appears in the sources, but the conclusions
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appear logical.
Fluctuating Mexican morale also contributed to Doniphan's victory. Ini-
tially the enemy forces expected to overcome the Americans quite easily, due
to their superior numbers and position.
73 This feeling may have contributed
to their willingness to allow Doniphan time to form ranks on the plateau. When
the Missourians successfully dispersed their attack, the Mexicans lost heart.
Although they defended the breastworks vigorously for a brief period, their
shattered confidence prevented any chance of rallying and regaining the initia-
tive, as subsequent events showed, such as the artillery's departure. The fact
that the Mexicans had never faced combat before, and had had only minimal train-
ing may also have contributed to their discouragement after Doniphan's initial
success. Despite their great advantages, since Doniphan had already beaten
the Mexicans in their minds with his early victory, they failed to put up the
stiff resistance which, given their superiority, should have defeated the
Americans.
In contrast, the Missourians' performance at Sacramento proved excellent.
Doniphan's early movements and unorthodox tactics took his opponents by surprise,
completely upsetting their battle plan. From the moment the Mexicans halted,
allowing the Americans time to form their ranks, they surrendered initiative
to Doniphan, who used this advantage to the best of his ability. The volunteers'
technological superiority also gave them a tremendous supremacy over their foes.
The range and accuracy of their weapons allowed them to inflict great damage
on Heredia' s troops, without suffering severely themselves. Clark's artillery,
of course, played a pre-eminent role in this success. His accuracy broke up
several Mexican troop concentrations and silenced their cannon, while his gun-
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ners' willingness to take their pieces clear up to the enemy lines enabled Don-
iphan to break through the entrenchments. Along with this, the men's high mor-
ale and confidence in victory carried them up to and over the Mexican works,
despite the storm of fire issuing from them. This esprit enabled them to over-
come the rather feeble resistance the Mexicans made. Finally, their harrying
of the retreating enemy clinched the triumph, since it gave the latter no chance
to rally and counterattack. Doniphan's tactical control of the battle and the
men's high morale gave them the victory.
Sacramento produced several practical advantages for the volunteers as
well. Its most immediate benefit was that it removed the final obstacle to
Chihuahua's capture. The small area of terrain between the battlefield and
the city offered no site for another stand against the Americans. Even if such
a position had existed, Trias no longer had an armed force to defend it. He
did manage to regather the regular units later, which would represent, a threat to
Doniphan's occupation. For the present, however, all organized resistance to
the gringos vanished, as the Mexicans scattered over the countryside. Most
of the militia quietly returned to their homes, destroying any evidence of their
armed service on the way. In addition, even if the citizens had wished to under-
take further resistance, Doniphan's victory effectively destroyed their means
to do so. The weapons and equipment he captured represented most of the avail-
able arms in the area, and subsequent confiscations during the occupation of
the city accounted for most of the rest. Therefore, even if the Mexicans had
wanted to oppose the conquest, they lacked the necessary equipment.
On the day following the battle, the Missourians' advance guard entered
the nearly empty city of Chihuahua. Most of the inhabitants had fled into the
hills, fearing the rapaciousness of the gringos . A few citizens remained behind,
but even they concealed themselves. This situation remained prevalent when
Doniphan paraded the rest of his force into the city on March 2, 1847, and con-
ducted a formal occupation ceremony. Aware of the people's hostility, which
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their enthusiasm in raising the Sacramento force had shown, he
undertook careful
precautions to prevent an uprising from surprising and massacring his men.
He quartered most of them in the public buildings and vacant houses
surrounding
the main square, with the artillery positioned to cover the square and all ap-
proaches to it. The remaining troops occupied the bullring on the edge of the
city and posted pickets there to protect themselves. Even after confiscating
all weapons found, the volunteers remained alert, since American prisoners they
had freed described the citizens' rampant hostility and the threats they
had
made against the captives prior to Doniphan's victory.
A significant contrast exists between Doniphan's occupation of El
Paso
and that of Chihuahua. Although no major incidents marred the latter period,
Chihuahua lacked the friendliness and open hospitality the Americans found
fur-
ther north. Despite the Missourian proclivities for drinking and
gambling,
less fraternization occurred. Several contemporary accounts mention
the large
number of thefts which the Mexicans perpetrated and the frequent whippings
meted
out to the offenders. Evidently, these punishments did not cause any
major
disputes with the local populace, for the same sources describe most of the
men so convicted as common criminals who deserved their fate. Still, these
diarists use the frequency of the thefts to indicate a lack of the pro-American
sentiments which El Paso had displayed.
On their side, the Hissourians had little respect for their hosts' property.
A trader's wife who arrived in Chihuahua during the occupation wrote: "The
citizens' houses were turned into stables, the roofs made kitchens of, the drink-
ing fountain used as a bathing trough, the trees barked and forever spoiled,
and a hundred other deprivations."
7 If the Hissourians paid for all of the
goods they consumed, (which they evidently did, since accounts mention no dif-
ficulties over that issue), they countered this with their rough treatment of
public and private facilities, something which did not occur in El Paso.
The volunteers found that Chihuahua was not as rich as they had believed.
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While El Paso was a thriving, prosperous community, Chihuahua had declined econ-
omically. The Mexicans had built a mint there to stamp the precious metals
mined locally. However, Indian activity had forced the abandonment of most
of these mines, including the salt works. Therefore the city's only remaining
major product was wheat. All other commodities came from outside sources, which
resulted in an unfavorable balance of trade. The local need for external goods
made business here profitable for the Americans, since the people would pay
high prices, but the city had few products to offer in exchange.
Despite tensions on both sides and his men's disrespect for property, Don-
iphan attempted to win the people over to the American side. Upon occupying
the city, he issued a proclamation asking the inhabitants to return to their
homes and resume their former businesses, particularly trade. He promised to
respect the rights, religion and property of all who remained neutral and punish
his men for any excesses they committed. The proclamation closed with a warning
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that those who took up arms again could expect American reprisals. Most of
the local people responded to this document to the extent that business returned
to normal, but it evidently did not alter their antipathy toward the Americans.
In a further gesture of goodwill, Doniphan released his hostages from El Paso.
After his victory, no organized force remained to assist an uprising there,
thus making its success improbable. P'urthermore , the prisoners' accounts of
the battle would dampen such a movement, since the "invincible Americans" could
deal with a revolt easily. Finally, Doniphan directed the local priests to
conduct funeral services for Major Owens (who had been a Catholic). He may
have hoped to show that the Americans could respect, and even share, the local
religion, and thus reduce the Mexican hostility. If this was his purpose it
failed, for the people felt that a gringo funeral profaned their church, rather
than that it showed sympathy for their beliefs.
The most significant incident of the occupation took place shortly after
the army's arrival. Colonel Mitchell led a party of men to occupy the governor's
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mansion and found the building locked up. Inquiries revealed that an Englishman
named Potts, who claimed to be the local British consul, had the necessary keys.
However, he refused to give them up, claiming that the building was under his
care and the Americans would not be given a chance to damage it. Accordingly,
Mitchell brought up a howitzer to blow in the doors, but some of the Missourians
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managed to enter by another door and opened the building from the inside.
Although this had no major effect on Mexican-American relations, it indicates
the depth of anti-American sentiment in the city, since even resident foreigners
seemed disposed to hinder Doniphan's occupation. Certainly Potts had economic
interests in the mint which Doniphan's conquest threatened, but this does not
adequately explain his willingness to obstruct the Missourians in an activity
which did not directly affect him. Perhaps his British sense of honor caused
his interference.
Aside from their normal gambling and drinking activities, Doniphan* s men
found several diversions in Chihuahua. Major Clark, for example, spent a great
9ft
deal of time correcting the book classifications in the palace library. Some
of the troops started an English language newspaper, which disseminated local
news and rumors of the war's progress. Some of the local citizens also arranged
a bullfight for the Missourians' amusement, but this entertainment fell rather
flat. Most accounts indicate that the men viewed it as a barbaric sport which
was proof of Mexican inferiority. Furthermore, the bulls used were not of high
quality and failed to defend themselves vigorously, thus presenting a dull spec-
tacle. Cockfighting proved more popular with the volunteers and became a major
recreation at which much betting took place.
In addition to the aforementioned events, military activities required
a great amount of the men's attention. They had to make new cartridges for
their own weapons as well as for the captured cannon. This work made at least
one soldier extremely nervous, for he observed the men so engaged were smoking
cigars andpipes, unconcerned about the huge amounts of loose gunpowder around
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them. The volunteers also undertook patrols of the surrounding countryside,
for frequent rumors of approaching Mexican forces circulated through Chihuahua.
Fortunately the rumors always proved false as at El Paso, but they kept the
soldiers alert and wary of a sudden attack.
Doniphan was well aware of his precarious position in Chihuahua. He now
occupied a city deep in hostile territory, cut off from communication with other
American armies, with little prospect of reinforcement. The route to Santa
Fe remained open, but guerrillas or a Mexican thrust from Sonora could cut it
at any time, thus completely isolating the Missourians. Furthermore, Doniphan
had not destroyed the enemy forces in Chihuahua. Governor Trias had established
himself at Parral in Northern Durango, and was gathering the stragglers from
Sacramento into a new force. This provided another threat to American security,
since it conceivably could attempt to recapture Chihuahua and destroy the Mis-
sourians. The local citizens themselves represented another danger. Consider-
ing their anti-American attitude, any Mexican victory might cause them to revolt
and attempt to massacre the garrison. Such an outbreak almost occurred when
preliminary reports of the Battle of Buena Vista indicated Santa Anna had won.
However, Doniphan quickly (and correctly) proclaimed an American victory by
firing a salute in Taylor's honor, thus averting an outbreak. Finally, the
volunteers themselves provided an additional problem. As at El Paso, they suf-
fered from boredom when limited to the relative inactivity of garrison life.
As a result, discipline became lax and the possibility of trouble with the loc-
als increased. Also, enlistments would expire in three months, necessitating
some action on Doniphan's part soon.
Several courses of action remained open to the Colonel. First, he could
abandon Chihuahua and attempt to join Taylor. Alternatively, he could return
to El Paso. If he remained in Chihuahua, he could undertake an aggressive cam-
paign to destroy Trias' military strength, or merely wait in the city until
enlistments expired. The latter course, however, merely delayed the decision
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concerning which direction to move. Doniphan himself desired an early departure;
but if the troops left, the Mexicans probably would massacre the traders who
remained behind. They were doing a profitable business in Chihuahua and had
no desire to leave soon.
In order to resolve his dilemma, Doniphan held a staff meeting to discuss
the options. Most of the officers favored remaining in the city until enlist-
ments expired, since they enjoyed its luxury. Doniphan, however, announced
that he was in favored "going home to Sarah and the children." This became
the enlisted men's slogan, for they quickly learned the events of the meeting.
Possibly Doniphan supplied this information to get their support for his views.
This proved immediately forthcoming, for the volunteers also longed for Missouri.
Two decisions came out of subsequent staff meetings, after the volunteers
made their feelings known. The Mexican retreat after Buena Vista cleared the
route to Wool and Taylor, so Doniphan sent a party to them in early April re-
questing orders. At the same time he opened negotiations with Trias for the
governor to resume control of Chihuahua on the condition that he would protect
the traders from molestation. Unfortunately, these talks collapsed when Trias
insisted that the Americans return all of the equipment captured at Sacramento
R1
and pay for any damages to the city. In an effort to compel Trias' acceptance
or at least eliminate his force as a threat, Doniphan led an expedition against
Parral. Reports of a large body of Mexicans approaching Chihuahua caused it
to return before reaching its goal, and no further contact with Trias took place
until near the end of the occupation.
Late in April, the messengers to General Taylor returned with orders for
Doniphan to join the main army. Despite rumors of their death or capture, only
one incident marred their trip. A party of Mexican militia had tried to arrest
them, but the couriers bluffed their way past it at gunpoint without casualties
on either side.
Beginning on April 25th, the volunteers departed Chihuahua for Saltillo
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in several bodies, amid great rejoicing among the Mexicans. ' Most of the trad*
ers, having sold all of their goods, departed with them. Generally, the march
proved uneventful. They suffered from thirst during the two-day Jornada , but
evidently not as severely as on previous occasions. Their earlier experiences
had taught them how to deal with such obstacles.
During this march, a scouting party fought the last engagement of the cam-
paign. Captain Heid, with a force of approximately 20 men entered the village
of El Poso, where they learned that a party of Comanches was raiding the area
and threatening the community. Responding to the people's pleas, Reid occupied
a large hacienda from which he could deal with the approaching Indians. When
the warriors attacked that night, Reid suddenly charged them from ambush. In
the ensuing skirmish, the Indians lost 1? killed and 25 wounded, including the
chief, out of ^ men. Reid was the only American casualty, sustaining two minor
arrow wounds. He also recovered 19 children and several hundred horses and
mules which the Comanches had already capturedo The grateful citizens presented
the volunteers with horses and Captain Reid with a formal letter of thanks.
The friendliness of El Poso proved the last the Missourians encountered
in Mexico. As they approached Taylor's army, the inhabitants became more hos-
tile. Once Doniphan sent a detachment back to protect the wagons from a body
of guerrillas which supposedly threatened them. This rumor was false, but some
of the citizens at Parras beat one of the artillerymen to death without provo-
cation, when the regiment passed through that village. In response, the vol-
unteers killed two Mexicans, a crime which Doniphan failed to punish. In fact,
the Missourians increasingly reacted violently to what they felt was unjustified
hostility, and the officers either could not or would not punish them.
On May 22nd, Doniphan's men arrived at Wool's headquarters in Saltillo,
where Wool reviewed them and commended them for their accomplishments. They
then moved on to Walnut Springs, where Taylor reviewed them on the 27th. At
this occasion the General asked Doniphan to describe the maneuver that won Sac-
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ramento, to which the Colonel replied: "Maneuvers be hanged. I told my boys
to charge — they were off like a shot — and that's all I know about it."
Taylor then issued orders for them to proceed to the Rio Grande, where shipping
would take them to New Orleans for discharge. Before they departed, Clark turned
his guns over to Taylor's artillery, but kept the cannon captured at Sacramento.
The march to the coast provided a few final adventures for Doniphan's men.
Although this last part of the march proved less arduous, since it lacked the
waterless jornadas of previous ones, local hostility provided greater danger.
Near one village, guerrillas ambushed and killed one of the regiment's advance
scouts. Subsequent search of the town produced five suspicious characters,
but lacking concrete evidence, Doniphan ordered their release. However, the
dead man's friends so desired vengence that they killed the men after their
release and then burned the house they had been found in. As at Parras, Don-
iphan failed to punish the volunteers involved, either because he could not
properly identify them or because popular opinion so favored their action that
he feared punishment would result in loss of control over his troops.
At Reynosa the Missourians boarded boats which took them to Brazos Island,
where Doniphan had already gone to arrange for transports to take them home.
Before leaving, they burned their horse tack, since no space for it remained
on the boats. Approximately 30 of the volunteers agreed to drive the horses
overland to Missouri at the rate of $10 a head, an offer which the remaining
men accepted.
At New Orleans, amid the enthusiastic welcome of the citizens, Doniphan's
men turned in the government equipment they had used, and received their dis-
charges and long-overdue pay. They then traveled up the Mississippi in small
groups, as inclination and transportation dictated. Most returned directly
home, but a large party of about 300 men, including Doniphan, halted at St.
Louis. Here the citizens held a reception in their honor consisting of a parade
and banquet on July 2nd. The St. Louis festival was only the first of many
6?
such celebrations, in which the volunteers received the plaudits of their friends
and neighbors. After a march of over 5,000 miles, suffering insignificant losses,
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they had returned home.
Conclusion
The practical results of Doniphan's independent expedition became obscured
by the publicity surrounding Taylor's battle of Buena Vista and Scott's invasion
of Mexico. From the time the Missourians left home, these two generals had
dominated the newspapers with their plans and campaigns. Taylor had invaded
Northern Mexico and defeated the Mexicans in several battles, among them Palo
Alto, Monterrey and Resaca de la Palma. Scott, meanwhile, had laid plans to
land on Mexico's Gulf Coast and strike straight for Mexico City, a target which
captured the Americans' imagination. Although these events seemed more evident-
ly consequential than those of the Missourians' march, the volunteers and their
partisans believed that they had accomplished great things. In terms of human
endurance and successful completion of objectives, if not influence on the war's
course, these beliefs seem justified.
Doniphan's success certainly had no effect on the further conduct of the
war. Polk's scheme to use Chihuahua as a base for an expedition to the Pacific
had vanished in the practical difficulties of pacifying territory only half-
sympathetic and penetrating the hostile interior from the east. By the time
Doniphan reached Chihuahua, military emphasis had shifted to Scott's forthcoming
invasion, and to this the government allocated most of its resources. Also
Chihuahua's distance from Mexico City prevented the occupation force from threat
ening that area and therefore caused little concern to the central government.
The Mexicans saw little danger to their capital from this source, for the long
journey from Chihuahua and the small size of the American force discouraged
an attack from that quarter. Further proof of Chihuahua's loss of importance
comes from Taylor's failure to reinforce it. After the battle of Buena Vista,
Taylor's army became merely a garrison force, with no further objectives. Tay-
lor could have dispatched troops at least to garrison the city, had he wished
or received orders to do so, particularly since his army now, included Wool's
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force which originally was destined for that point.
This lack of official support caused the campaign to fail in one of its
original primary purposes: the seizure of territory as a bargaining counter
for peace negotiations. Without reinforcements, Doniphan could not hold Chi-
huahua, since his men would leave when their enlistments expired, a problem
common to all U.S. forces. Therefore, when assistance did not arrive, the op-
portunity to retain Chihuahua vanished. In any case, the Americans had already
captured the territories they wanted most — New Mexico, California and the
disputed part of Texas — so they had no objectives for which to trade Chihua-
hua. This lack of support also caused the final collapse of intentions to add
the state to American territory. These plans had essentially vanished when
the Missourians discovered that the local Mexicans were hostile to U.S. control,
rather than friendly as reports had led them to believe. Aware of the diffi-
culties involved in pacifying a semi-hostile territory, as evidenced by their
own Navajo campaign and the revolt in New Mexico later, they realized that the
effort required to pacify this more hostile area would not equal the rewards
involved.
The volunteers' discovery that reports had exaggerated Chihuahua's wealth
further supported this decision. They had expected to find a city rich from
the products of surrounding mines. However, as mentioned earlier, Indian hos-
tility had closed down nearly all of the mining operations, leaving only limited
farming as an economic base. Therefore Chihuahua had not the economic import-
ance to encourage an American takeover in the face of strong opposition. Nor
would its loss disrupt Mexican economy to any great extent. For the same reason
it was a poor bargaining counter, since the Mexican government did not consider
fi7
it rich enough to offer major concessions or other territory for its return.
Finally, Doniphan's success did not encourage the Mexicans to discuss peace.
Both the region's remoteness and minimal economic importance contributed to
their attitude. However, both belligerents' emphasis on other theaters repre-
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sented the main factor in this failure. After Buena Vista the war shifted south-
ward as Scott prepared to invade Vera Cruz. Since the Mexicans expected to
defeat the Americans in that region, the loss of an unimportant province which
they had already abandoned to its own resources provided no incentive to discuss
peace.
One could argue that Doniphan's campaign tied down Mexican troops which
might have joined Santa Anna, thus achieving one objective, but this seems ten-
uous at best. The troops Trias raised to fight the Missourians were local vol-
unteers, organized solely to defend the state and retake New Mexico if possible.
The central government had already withdrawn one local military force for ser-
vice elsewhere, which greatly annoyed the population. The possibility that
Chihuahua vrould release a force raised and equipped by its own efforts for its
own defense, to an unpopular government in order to fight in another part of
Mexico appears remote. Considering that many of the men were poorly armed and
therefore could contribute only limited assistance further increases its unlik-
lihood. Had Doniphan not invaded, Trias probably never would have organized
his army, since its purpose was to defend the state,
Doniphan's only significant strategic achievement lay in the results of
his Navajo campaign. 3y successfully rounding up the hostile Indians and con-
vincing them to sign a peace treaty, he established a peaceful situation which
allowed American forces to concentrate on other matters. True, some of the
Navajo participated in the Taos revolt in 184? and the whites did not subdue
the tribe completely until the l860*s, but Doniphan did convince a large part
of it to remain quiet for the rest of the war. By doing so, he freed his own
regiment for the Chihuahua expedition and created a situation which allowed
the garrison forces to concentrate on civil matters and introduce the American
system to the local populace. Had he failed to pacify the Indians, the U.S.
would have needed to allocate many of the available troops to defend the terri-
tory against their depredations. The Taos revolt might have succeeded, since
71
fewer troops would have been free to deal with it. In achieving its other ob-
jectives Doniphan's expedition failed, but his Navajo campaign helped to ensure
that New Mexico would remain in American hands and become a federal territory.
According to most authors, the major impact of the Chihuahua campaign lay
in its psychological effects, rather than its material achievements. In this
context, it contributed primarily to the U.S. reputation of invincibility and
to the Mexican habit of defeat. Twice the Missourians fought superior enemy
forces and came away victorious. Once the Mexicans surprised them in camp,
and the other time they had the advantage of entrenched positions, yet in both
battles the volunteers inflicted many casualties on the enemy while suffering
few themselves. In many Mexican minds this created a belief that they never
could conquer the Americans thus weakening their will to win, especially when
further discouraged by Taylor's successes. This attitude showed itself in what
contemporary observers referred to as "Mexican cowardice": their failure to
stand against the gringos . The dispersal of Trias' army at Sacramento provides
an acceptable example of this. As Doniphan drove the enemy before him, the
Mexicans began to believe that they could not win against him. Even Trias never
seriously threatened the regiment after Sacramento although he refused to sur-
render and reoccupied Chihuahua after the volunteers left. One can assume that
this attitude spread to other parts of the country where it undermined the na-
tional will to resist and added to American military prestige.
Weapons superiority was a major factor in Doniphan's success. As pointed
out elsewhere, his men's rifles had greater range and accuracy than most Mex-
ican shoulder arms, thus making the volunteers' fire more deadly and demoraliz-
ing to the enemy. Even more important at Sacramento was American artillery
superiority. Clark and Weightman handled the U.S. guns brilliantly. They si-
lenced the Mexican artillery, drove the enemy under cover and then dragged their
pieces right up to the entrenchments to punch holes in them for Doniphan's as-
sault. The accuracy of the American guns, which destroyed enemy cannon and
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troops, demoralized Trias' men and broke up their attempts to rally, thus pre-
venting their efforts at strong resistance. In contrast, the newly-cast, home-
made Mexican artillery proved unable to inflict serious damage on the Missour-
ians, thus further discouraging the Chihuahuans. Had Clark's men not served
their guns so courageously and so well, the volunteers would have suffered much
greater casualties in overrunning the fortifications, if they succeeded at all.
The expedition's propaganda value represented its second major importance.
It not only added to the myth of U.S. invincibility, a significant propaganda
point, but it illustrated the average American's ability to undergo hardship.
One certainly cannot underplay the difficulties the Hissourians overcame. They
made the longest march of any units involved in the war, with minimal government
support. They crossed waterless deserts, suffering the extremes of temperature
common to such regions. Although this indicates their willingness to face hard-
ships, expedition accounts point out that Doniphan's men took basic precautions
to deal with these obstacles, such as bringing extra water, tents and blankets.
While they suffered from weather and occasional lack of necessities, they did
not march out unprepared, as some accounts suggest. The volunteers showed their
willingness to face difficulties, especially since they continued on where op-
portunities to turn back occurred, as at El Paso. They showed that Americans
could overcome all obstacles to achieve their goals, and thus discourage Mex-
ican opposition.
Most studies of the Mexican Vfar emohasize the innate abilities of Doniphan's
Ben as the campaign's greatest attribute and fail to discuss other successes
or failures of Doniphan's march. They compare it with Xenophon's expedition,
usually to the detriment of the latter, and tend to minimize the effect of the
Americans' victories on the campaign's success. One suspects, however, that
Doniphan's tactical skill and the Hissourians' high morale contributed more
to its triumph than mere fortitude.
Throughout the campaign the volunteers' high morale furthered their success.
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Always eager to meet the Mexicans in combat,, they continuously favored pushing
onward toward Chihuahua, the final objective, as the vote at El Paso showed.
Their performance in the battles of Brazito and Sacramento, where they attacked
in the face of discouraging obstacles, further substantiates this assessment.
The volunteers' confidence in their own abilities and those of their officers
helped them endure the difficulties imposed by distance, tension and rumors of
overwhelming opposition.
A great part of the volunteers' confidence arose from their view of the
Mexican foe. Initially they saw the average Mexicans as basically friendly,
interested in the advantages of American annexation and likely to put up little
opposition. Contact with the people of Santa Fe and El Paso seemed to substan-
tiate this picture. Most of the citizens greeted the soldiers as allies, after
some nervousness concerning the form occupation would take. Doniphan's men
described these people as oppressed and poverty-stricken. Generally, the Mis-
sourians looked upon the upper-class Mexicans, particularly the priests as "with
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few exceptions, below their followers in morals and character." To some ex-
tent, this probably stemmed from anti-Catholic sentiment, which ran strongly
in the states during this period. It remained, however, a minority opinion
among the volunteers.
Doniphan's men also had great confidence in their ability to overcome armed
opposition. Believing in the basic friendliness of the inhabitants and their
inferiority in military affairs (as evidenced by campaigns in Texas), the Mis-
sourians expected to defeat any resistance encountered. The battles of Brazito
and Sacramento confirmed this belief, when the volunteers' aggressiveness and
esprit proved greater than that of the Mexicans. The ease with which they won
these combats convinced them of their own fighting superiority and the weakness
of the enemy.
Because the volunteers looked upon most of Northern Mexico favorably, fing-
ing it a fertile region rich in economic potential, they expected the United
States to annex the area as a result of the war. In their diaries they frequent-
ly mentioned the benefits it would receive from American rule, such as a more
benevolent government and greater personal freedom, and they discussed ways
to increase mining and farming production. The Missourians saw New Mexico as
a region which would benefit the United States in other fields besides trade,
an idea which probably had occurred to few of them prior to seeing it.
Of course, the conquest and occupation of Chihuahua altered these opinions,
at least concerning that state. The population's hostility discouraged attempts
to introduce the benefits of American government, and the difficulties involved
in overcoming these attitudes seemed greater than the rewards warrented. The
region's poverty, in contrast with its reported wealth, suggested little oppor-
tunity for economic gain, and thus no advantages lay in annexation. The con-
stant hostility soured the Missourians toward the local people, making them
less sympathetic to their conditions. The discovery that several Mexican pris-
oners of war, who were released after Brazito under the truce arrangements,
but had fought at Sacramento, heightened the soldier's disgust with Mexicans.
It added to the feeling of untrustworthy Mexicans. The civilians' attacks on
them during their return home, which the volunteers considered unjustified,
further increased their dislike of the people, at least in that area. While
Doniphan's men came out of the campaign with a sense of accomplishment resulting
from conquering New Mexico and then making their successful march, they undoubt-
edly felt that the Chihuahua occupation served little purpose and the U.S. had
no use for that state.
Among a minority of the Missourians, the question concerning whether the
population of Chihuahua could ever become Americanized further contributed to
their discouragement with that state. These men reflected a feeling which had
arisen out of the "annex all Mexico" movement, that the Mexicans were an infer-
ior "Indian" race and could not learn the virtues of U.S. citizenship. Those
people who believed in this generally did not oppose annexation of territory.
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Instead they proposed that the number of Mexicans the country could absorb was
limited and therefore the government should acquire only the sparsely inhabited
portions of the nation to the south. To these few volunteers this would have
meant annexing New Mexico and abandoning hostile Chihuahua.
Mexican reaction to Doniphan's invasion also varied according to the region.
While one author claims that Doniphan's success showed that most Mexicans were
apathetic to the war, since his men made a long journey without much opposition,
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this argument overlooks several other factors. Much pro-American sympathy
existed in Northern Mexico, particularly in New Mexico. In that region friendly
feelings for Americans defused attempts to organize opposition to Doniphan's
advance and created the welcoming atmosphere. In Chihuahua, however, Trias'
war party overcame the American supporters and built up a strong spirit for
resistance, Doniphan's victory, which destroyed the equipment and army which
the people had labored hard to create, merely hardened their hostility. Al-
though the citizens made no overt resistance to American occupation, they did
not welcome the Missourians as friends. Even the attempts to encourage inter-
action, which had worked well in El Paso, failed to alter Chihuahua's attitude.
Probably the most significant result of the campaign from the Missourians'
viewpoint was the reopening of trade with Northern Mexico, after all a major
reason for undertaking the campaign. By the time he departed, Doniphan and
Trias had reached an informal agreement guaranteeing American merchants' lives
and property in Chihuahua, thus ensuring the continuation of trade with its
profits for the United States. Of course, American conquest had already ensured
the continuation of commerce with Santa Fe and El Paso. Since this trade di-
rectly affected the Missourians, they had a great interest in its restoration
and viewed it with satisfaction, and it did play an important role in the econ-
omic life of the U.S. and Mexico. Furthermore, if Chihuahua ever became able
to reopen its mines the profits from trading there would increase greatly, since
the precious metals it produced would be a valuable commodity. Reopening of
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trade probably represents the only valid justification for Doniphan's invasion.
The volunteers also took pride in their avenging the insults Mexico had
given Americans for the past several years. They had easily defeated two hos-
tile armies and occupied an enemy city, with minimal losses. Further satisfac-
tion came from the fact that they had won these victories over the forces of
the Mexican state from which most of those insults had come. Doniphan's vol-
unteers showed the Mexicans the power of their northern neighbor and warned
them that they could not harm U.S. citizens with impunity. In short, Doniphan's
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men had taught the enemy a lesson and satisfied American honor.
In addition to these points, the campaign also undoubtedly aided the sub-
sequent careers of at least two of the officers: Doniphan and Major Gilpin.
Doniphan resumed his legal practice after the war, generally remaining inactive
in public affairs, except for another term in the Missouri legislature in 185^,
and an unsuccessful bid for U.S. representative in I856. Given the public liking
for military heroes, his expedition probably gained him much support during
these elections. In i860 his fame earned him a position as a Missouri delegate
to the Washington Peace Conference, which futilely attempted to avert the seces-
sion crisis by producing a compromise settlement. Then the next year, secession-
minded Governor Jackson appointed him major-general in charge of the state mil-
itia. Again his Chihuahua campaign probably influenced this appointment, since
it had proven him an able and popular leader of Missouri troops. However, grief
over his son's recent death and his wife's ill-health caused Doniphan to resign
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almost immediately.
Doniphan failed to participate in the Civil War, due to poor health and
his Unionist sympathies. He alone of the Missourians at the Peace Conference
had opposed secession. This attitude so conflicted with his neighbors in Liberty
that he had to flee to St. Louis after the war began. His health prevented
him from joining the Union forces, so he remained quietly in the city until
1868, when he moved to Richmond, Missouri and resumed his legal career. He
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died alone in Richmond in 1889. The strong Rebel sentiment in
Liberty kept
him from ever returning there, although he still referred
to it as home.
Gilpin immediately returned to military service after his discharge in
Missouri. He organized and led a regiment which dealt with Indian
depradations
along the Santa Fe Trail until the end of the war. His participation
in Don-
iphan's expedition probably helped attract volunteers, as well as
gain official
sanctions for his activity. The only other effect of his war
experience appear-
ed in 1861, when Lincoln appointed him the first territorial
governor of Col-
orado. Certainly it was a factor in his favor, especially considering
the se-
cession tensions, which briefly threatened to add the territory to the
Confed-
eracy. In a whirlwind campaign, Gilpin drove out the Rebels,
thus saving Col-
orado for the Union. Despite his lesser role in the conquest, he
received great-
er rewards than Doniphan, although the latter could have had
them if he had
so desired.
Although Doniphan's campaign had little effect on the course of
the war,
since the major reasons for capturing Chihuahua no longer remained strategic
considerations, it did provide several benefits. It demonstrated the
military
capabilities of volunteer troops if competently led and confident in
their own
skills. While the campaign also provided a remarkable example of
American fort-
itude and fighting ability against the Mexicans, authors have
overemphasized
this as its sole significance. Yet the expedition's major accomplishments lay in
the reopening of the important Southwestern trade, between Missouri and
Northern
Mexico, and its indirect protection of U.S. control of New Mexico. Doniphan
not only restored a major economic link between the two countries, he neutral-
ized the military power of Chihuahua. This prevented Trais from reconquering
New Mexico and thereby depriving the U.S. of one of its main war aims. Without
Doniphan, the country might have lost the opportunity to annex the Southwest,
for Trias could have invaded and retaken control of it. These are the consid-
erations which made the campaign significant.
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to Chihuahua ahead of the army, and was arrested for being an American. His
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his account. However, he did provide some interesting material concerning the
province prior to Doniphan's conquest, plus a detailed account of the march
to Saltillo.
Four general contemporary studies of the Mexican War, published shortly
after its termination, provided material on Doniphan's campaign. The War With
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.
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ity. Jose Maria Roa Barcena's Recuerdos de la Invasion Norte Americana 18^6-
1848 (3 vol., Editorial Porrua S.A.; Mexico, 19^7) follows this trend in its
description of the campaign in Volume 1. Generally it agrees with Ramsey's
description and interpretation of events, with only a few minor differences.
Barcena gives more material on American movements than Ramsey does, and accepts
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sidered one of the best books on the war since Smith, in part due to his use
of original sources, Bauer provides a useful, readable overview of Doniphan's
work, but includes no significant discoveries or conclusions. Both books, how-
ever, provide an excellent starting point for studying the campaign, due to
their accurate narrative of events.
The other secondary histories consulted, Robert Henry's The Story of the
Mexican War (New York; Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), To Conquer a Peace (Garden
City; Doubleday & Co., 197*+) by John Weems, and History of the Mexican War (Wash-
ington D.C.; Church News Publishing Co., 1892) by Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox all
furnish rather standard accounts of the trek. All three supply basic informa-
tion concerning it with no attempt at interpretation. All of them emphasize
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the difficulties the volunteers faced and their fortitude in overcoming them.
They include little material about Mexican defensive preparations, except for
Wilcox, who goes into some detail on the subject. In short, all three works
merely confirm previous facts without providing any new ones.
A few general secondary works had information pertaining to Doniphan.
Paul Horgan's Great River; The Rio Grande in North American History (2 vol.,
New York; Rinehart & Co., 195*0 includes some discussion of the campaign in
the second volume. Like most other works, Horgan fails to analyze the expedi-
tion and he does not include adequate coverage of events after El Paso's occu-
pation, which occurred away from the river, He does contribute some unique
detailed information concerning the Valverde encampment, however. He also in-
dicates that the Mexican population was more hostile and the Missourians less
brave and disciplined than most authors imply.
Another useful work was Florence C. and Robert H. Listers' Chihuahua:
Storehouse of Storms (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1966) „ A
general history of the province, this work supplies much useful information
concerning its attitude towards the Americans, as well as a lengthy description
of the city's occupation by Doniphan. The rest of the campaign and the actual
Mexican defense preparations receive only sketchy coverage, however, thus de-
tracting from an otherwise well-done book.
New Mexico's Royal Road; Trade and Travel on the Chihuahua Trail (Norman;
University of Oklahoma Press, 1958) by Max L. Moorhead also proved quite val-
uable. A history of trade in Chihuahua, it furnished much useful material on
Missouri-Chihuahua commerce, particularly on Mexican attitudes and restrictions.
The account of Doniphan's campaign is rather brief, but focuses on its role in
reopening trade. Moorhead 's chapter on the traffic's significance also provides
some intriguing concepts.
Still another interesting work was G.L. Rives' The United States and Mexico
1821-18^-3 (2 vol., New York; Kraus Reprint Co., 1969 0-911] )• Rlves provides
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little background information on the expedition itself, but his pre-war mater-
ial on Mexican-American relations contained some worthwhile points, and he makes
several interesting inferences about the campaign's effects. The events them-
selves receive only cursory coverage in Volume 2, which agrees with most of
the other sources. Nevertheless, the conclusions make the work worth consulting.
Aside from the material in Connelley mentioned earlier, four general bio-
graphical sources provided information on Doniphan. These consist of: The
Cyclopedia of American biographies edited by John H. Brown (Vol. 2 of 7 volumes,
Boston; The Cyclopedia Publishing Co., 1897), Dictionary of American Biography
edited by Allan Johnson and Dumas Malone (Vol. 5 of 20 volumes, New York; Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1930), Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography edited by
James Wilson and John Fiske, (Vol. 2 of 8 volumes, New York; Appleton Publishing
Co., 1900) and the National Cyclopedia of American Biography , anonymous editors
(Vol. 11 of 15 volumes, New York; James T. White & Co., 1909). All of these
contain relatively similar information describing Doniphan's early life and
military career. D.A.B. does furnish more specifics on his postwar. life. Wil-
son and Fiske also contain some unique material. Beyond this, however, all
four say approximately the same thing, although Brown's work proved least in-
formative
.
Biographies of two other men connected with the campaign also were useful.
Dwight L. Clarke's Stephen Watts Kearny Soldier of the West (Norman; University
of Oklahoma Press, 196l) had worthwhile accounts of the force's organization
and march to Santa Fe, from General Kearny's viewpoint. Acceptable coverage
of the city's occupation also made up part of the book. Of course, it focused
on Kearny's difficulties, so Doniphan played only a minor role. William Gilpin;
Western Nationalist (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1970) by Thomas Karnes
looked at the expedition from Major Gilpin's angle. Its primary value lay in
the descriptions of regimental politics and daily life in the unit. In addition,
the author drew some interesting conclusions on why the campaign succeeded, and
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gave much material concerning Gilpin's subsequent career.
Several works on Manifest Destiny contributed facts on that creed's role
in bringing on the war and the campaign. Albert K. Weinberg's Manifest Destiny,
A Study of Nationalist Expansionism (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1935) pro-
vided the most detailed view. He includes lengthy descriptions of all of the
factors which made up this attitude and its part in American history. Of parti-
cular interest is the section concerning how it influenced American perceptions
of the Mexicans and the unusual ideas Weinberg proposes in this context.
Frederick Merk's Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New
York; Alfred A. Knopf, I965) represents another worthwhile work in this field.
It focuses almost exclusively on the Mexican War era, and therefore covers it
more thoroughly than Weinberg. Like him, Merk also contributes some interesting
insights into the influence of various aspects of Manifest Destiny. His com-
ments on attitudes toward native assimilation proved particularly useful.
Manifest Destiny , edited by Norman Graebner (New York; Bobbs-Merrill Co.
,
1968) and Graebner's Empire on the Pacific (New York; Ronald Press Co., 1955)
round out this section of sources. The former work is a collection of contem-
porary writings concerning various aspects of the subject. Its main value lies
in the picture it provides of the actual views of the proponents. The latter
book concentrates on American attempts to gain Oregon and California, but touches
on other regions that interested the U.S. at that time. Its portrayal of New
Mexico's role in the Pacific Coast acquisitions, as well as the province's own
usefulness, proved especially valuable.
All of these sources contributed to this study to some degree. The large
number of primary works, surprising considering the obscurity of the campaign,
proved especially helpful. Most of the books generally agreed on the events
and their effects, but enough differences appeared to produce some interesting
insights. The secondary sources basically furnished details on the campaign's
finer points, plus conclusions concerning the expedition's value 8
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Doniphan's expedition against Chihuahua in 1846-1847 represents one of
the forgotten campaigns of the Mexican War. A Missouri lawyer commanding a
regiment of volunteers from that state, Doniphan marched from Santa Fe to Chi-
huahua, Mexico without regular army support, and overcame all opposition along
the route. In the process, he proved his abilities of both military command
and leadership of militia units. Doniphan successfully accomplished his objec-
tives vrithout suffering serious losses or losing his authority over the indepen-
dent-minded volunteers.
Several reasons existed for undertaking this campaign. First, Chihuahua
was the terminus of the trade route from Missouri through Santa Fe, and there-
fore its capture had an economic importance for American commerce, since the
war had closed that market. Interest also existed for annexing the province
to the United States or possibly trading it for other territory the Americans
wanted. Reports indicated that the inhabitants sympathized with the U.S., which
would make annexation easy. In addition, the campaign would eliminate hostile
Mexican forces in the region, thus preventing them from threatening other Amer-
ican units or reinforcing the main Mexican army.
When Doniphan's men embarked on the campaign in December 1846, they already
had gained some practical experience on the march from Missouri and rounding
up hostile Indians for a peace conference near Santa Fe. This helped accustom
them to the expedition's hardships, which included long waterless stretches of
road, cold weather and lack of fuel for campfires. Lacking government supplies,
they bartered for most of their needs with the natives, who proved quite friendly
toward the Americans. Although the volunteers suffered under these hardships,
they continued to advance without complaints.
The Missourians met their first opposition outside El Paso at Brazito.
Here 1200 Mexicans surprised their main body, about 500 strong, making camp.
2However, Doniphan had time to get his men into battle formation and stopped
the enemy charge viith rifle volleys at close range. A U.S. countercharge then
routed the Mexicans and captured much of their equipment. The remaining Mex-
icans retreated to Chihuahua, allowing Doniphan to occupy El Paso without op-
position.
Doniphan remained in El Paso a month waiting for artillery support. Ke
originally intended to unite with a larger American force which supposedly had
already captured Chihuahua, but reports now proved that it had abandoned the
campaign. Although the Hixxourians favored continuing, they needed cannon to
ensure their victory, thus the delay. The stay was pleasant, however, for most
of the citizens preferred American dominence and therefore were quite friendly
with the volunteers. Doniphan contributed to the goodwill by insisting that
his men respect Mexican rights and pay for all goods taken. With few exceptions
they did so, thus showing Doniphan's ability to control his men.
When the artillery arrived in early February, increasing his force to 1000
men including traders, Doniphan advanced on Chihuahua. The soldiers suffered
all of the previous difficulties, but met no serious obstacles until they reach-
ed the Sacramento River. Here, the province's entire military strength of 4000
armed men blocked the road with entrenchments and artillery. In a brilliant
maneuver, Doniphan flanked the defenses, then surprised the Mexicans by charging
them. After a sharp fight the defenders fled, leaving the Americans in posses-
sion of their artillery, all of their supplies and the road to Chihuahua.
While peaceful, the occupation of Chihuahua lacked the good relations which
had marked that of El Paso. The inhabitants proved hostile to American control
and Doniphan's attempts to win them over failed. The volunteers reciprocated
these feelings by damaging the public buildings, although they obeyed Doniphan's
orders to remain well-behaved and pay for supplies. Besides this hostility,
discovery that reports had exaggerated Chihuahua's wealth and the Missourians*
impending enlistment expirations eliminated any intentions of retaining control
of the city. After tvio months, Doniphan abandoned it and led his force to the
Gulf Coast, where it boarded ships for the States and its discharge. Aside
from some local hostility, this movement occurred without incident.
Although the invasion of Chihuahua failed in its original intent of occupy-
ing the region, several beneficial results did accrue from it. Aside from its
display of American hardihood in overcoming natural obstacles, it portrayed the
Ilissourians as invincible , since they won both battles and suffered only 20
combat casualties. The qualitative superiority of American rifles and artillery,
as well as the Ilissourians' high morale, aided in these successes. Furthermore,
the expedition neutralised Chihuahua's military strength, thus preventing its
use against New Mexico and protecting that region from reconquest. Also, it
reopened the trade between Missouri and Chihuahua, thereby restoring this sig-
nificant economic factor. These practical results justified the campaign.
Several primary and secondary sources provided valuable information con-
cerning this campaign. Among the former, John Hughes' Doniphan's Expedition
and Frank Edwards' A Campaign in New Mexico proved most useful. Cf the secon-
dary studies, Justin Smith's The V.Tar With Mexico , William Connelley's Doniphan's
Expedition and K. Jack Bauer's The Mexican War 18^-6-18^8 gave worthwhile mat-
erial
.
